

Turkish Area Studies *Review*

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TASG

Spring Symposium 2008

and

Annual General Meeting

**Emmanuel College
Cambridge**

Saturday 19 April 2008

10.00 am to 4.30 pm

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Editorial

Readers will be aware that our last issue, No 10 (autumn 2007), was the final one to be edited by Belma Ötüş Baskett, who had been Editor since the inception of the new-style *Review* in spring 2003. The *Review* and the Turkish Area Study Group are deeply indebted to her for establishing the distinctive ‘personality’ of the *Review* and for ensuring that the contents of each successive issue were not only of a consistently high quality, but also that they offered a satisfyingly eclectic mix: items for a wide variety of interests and tastes. During the last five years the *Review* has won much esteem and many friends.

The *Review* is still seeking a new Editor, and the advertisement for this role, which has already been widely circulated, is reprinted in this issue (on the inside back cover). In the meantime, since it is the Council’s duty to see that the *Review* appears regularly and on time (indeed our Constitution enjoins us to do so), we have had to make do with an Acting Editor, who warmly acknowledges the immense collaboration and support he has received from contributors, from those who have procured contributions, and from the *Review*’s Secretary.

The contents speak for themselves. They are, we believe, of outstanding quality, and they cater, as usual, for a range of interests. The *Review* makes no apology for presenting on this occasion three political/historical articles on Cyprus (as well as an archaeological one), since, in the opinion of many, 2008, with a presidential election in the South in February, will be the year of make or break for a Cyprus settlement. Our poetry in parallel texts this time consists exceptionally of the same poem in three versions: handwritten Ottoman, modern Turkish and the English translation. As always, opinions expressed and stances taken are exclusively those of the contributors themselves.

The *Review* welcomes recent developments at the London School of Economics, with the arrival of Professor Şevket Pamuk to take up the new chair of Contemporary Turkish Studies.

On 19 February 2008 the Council had the pleasure of meeting the new Turkish Ambassador, His Excellency Yiğit Alpogan, and his colleague Counsellor Sadık Arslan for a discussion of matters of joint interest.

We mourn the death on 12 February 2008 of the doyen of Turkish studies in the United Kingdom, Professor Geoffrey Lewis. An appreciation appears in this issue.

John Martin
Acting Editor

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Noteworthy Events

by

Ayşe Furlonger

Exhibitions

Genghis Khan and his Heirs - The Great Mongolian Empire

The Sabancı University *Sakıp Sabancı Museum* is a private fine arts museum in Istanbul dedicated to calligraphic art, religious and state documents, as well as paintings of the Ottoman era. The museum was founded by Sakıp Sabancı, and was opened in June 2002. Aside from permanent exhibitions, the museum also hosts national and foreign temporary exhibitions as well as cultural events at weekends.

The Museum's third major temporary exhibition was held between 7 December 2006 and 8 April 2007, and was dedicated to Genghis Khan in conjunction with the 800th anniversary of the founding of the Mongol Empire. Titled *Genghis Khan and his Heirs - The Great Mongolian Empire*, it brought together 600 pieces from major museums in Germany, Austria, Mongolia and Turkey, some of which were seen by the public for the first time. The exhibition was jointly organized by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mongolian Ministry of Education, Culture and Science.

Abidin Dino

Between 24 November 2007 and 27 January 2008, the museum was hosting works and documents of the renowned Turkish painter Abidin Dino, a multi-faceted artist and man of culture, who passed away 14 years ago. The comprehensive exhibition will comprise his drawings and writings along with photographs and documents chronicling the various periods throughout his 80 years in Turkey, France and other countries.

Abidin Dino was interested in everything that was alive, skilfully capturing images with his brush, pencil and camera. He had two favourite themes: hands and flowers. In a book of small drawings, which he did for his wife Güzin, published on the tenth anniversary of his death, glimpses are seen of the love and sense of solidarity which were his inspiration. Entitled *Güzin's Abidins*, this book consists of drawings and essays by Abidin Dino.

One may come across his name in numerous art galleries and museums around the world, in a poem, the lyrics of a song, or a book. He is not only one of the pioneers of modern Turkish painting, but produced masterful works in such disparate fields as caricature, sculpture, ceramics, cinema, and literature.

Cihat Burak

Istanbul Museum of Modern Art organised an exhibition on the life and art of Cihat Burak (1915-1994), the unconventional master of modern Turkish art, who offers an unparalleled insight into Turkey's social and cultural history. *Cihat Burak Retrospective* brings together a number of works that mark 50 years of the versatile artist's creative production.

Comprising 220 works by Cihat Burak, the exhibition included paintings, ceramics, and print works. Furthermore, the exhibition also included 23 photographs of Cihat Burak, taken by renowned Turkish photographer Ara Güler. The exhibition was open to the public between 13 December 2007 and 23 March 2008 at the Temporary Exhibition Hall.

Cihat Burak was an architect, painter, and short-story writer, who recreated the flavour of the past and combined folk tradition with the elements of Ottoman art through Western methods. He was an artist who explored and exercised the possibilities of lines on different surfaces such as canvas, paper, ceramic and metal plate. Tradition and universality, imagination and reality are closely interconnected in his art. Renowned for his unconventional personality, Cihat Burak saw art as a reflection of life. He aimed to capture a glimpse of the life he led. Dreams, poems, and even fantasies blend into his paintings; he creates a unique language by combining surreal elements with a brilliantly dark humour.

Events

2007 The Year of Mevlana

The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared 2007 the Year of Mevlana. Rumi, the 13th century philosopher was commemorated around Turkey and the world with various activities and performances. A million people were expected to descend on Konya, a city in central Turkey, from 10 to 17 December for a mystical festival.

The festival commemorated the death of a great philosopher and mystic of Islam, Mevlana (also known as Rumi) whose doctrine advocates unlimited tolerance, positive reasoning, goodness, charity and awareness through love. His philosophy is encapsulated in one of his poems:

**Come come whoever you are,
Whether you are a non-believer,
Whether you worship fire or an idol,
Whether you have repented a hundred times,
Whether you have broken a vow of repentance a hundred times,
This is not a vow of desperation;
Come however you are.**

London was one of the cities that played host to a Rumi event within the framework '2007 Year of Mevlana'. On 6 October 2007 in the Cadogan Hall, London, following a brief speech by Professor Mahmud Erol Kılıç, whirling dervishes put on a performance. An exhibition **Mevlana and Mevlevilik** about Rumi was launched and photos from an exhibition in Istanbul's Aya Sofya, which had been displayed from July to August, were put on display for visitors. The exhibition will visit other cities as well.

The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism supported the event. Turkey's Ambassador to London, Yiğit Alpogan and his wife, Undersecretary Atılay Ersan from the Embassy, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' Representative to London, Dilek Yavuz Yanık, were among the guests.

The 10th International Istanbul Biennial

The International Istanbul Biennial is a contemporary art exhibition, held every two years in Istanbul since 1987. The biennial is organised by the Istanbul Foundation. The 10th International Istanbul Biennial opened on 8 September and closed its doors on 4 November 2007 under the curatorship of Hou Hanru.

The Biennial's conceptual framework was *Not only Possible, but also Necessary: Optimism in the Age of Global War* and more than 150 projects of 96 international artists and artist groups were exhibited in 5 venues.

Turkey's biggest contemporary art show, the 10th International Istanbul Biennial was visited by 91,000 people and transformed Istanbul into a giant art platform between 8 September and 4 November.

- The Atatürk Cultural Center's *Burn It Or Not?* exhibition consisted of 13 projects and contained works by 43 artists and artist groups.
- The Kadıköy Halk Eğitim Merkezi accommodated special projects, panel discussions and film screenings.
- The Pace Art Center's children's art workshops welcomed a total of more than 800 enthusiastic children and adolescents twice a week at Antrepo No 3 for the duration of the Biennial.
- In addition to these organizations, 34 leading corporations in Istanbul supported the 10th International Istanbul Biennial.
- A team of young curators from Istanbul collected approximately 100 original works of video and organised free public screenings in 25 different locations in the city.

The 11th International Istanbul Biennial will take place in Autumn 2009.

British Turks March to Protest Against Terrorism

Perhaps around 5,000 people from Britain's Turkish community turned out for a lively march on Sunday, 25 November 2007, through the centre of London, calling for the British government to be more active and vigilant in opposing the PKK and other terrorist groups. The demonstration included some Kurds, and a number of banners stated that Turks and Kurds were brothers. Marchers assembled opposite the Turkish Embassy in Belgrave Square and finished at 10 Downing Street. The march was organised by the 'British Turks Against Terrorism' Platform.

Recent events in Iraq with the Kurds triggered off demonstrations in London by the Turkish Community. Known as the PKK after its Kurdish name, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, this group is labelled a terrorist organization and continues to conduct strikes inside Turkey. The Turkish Community inside and outside Turkey is outraged by the actions of this terrorist organisation, and the demonstration was held as a protest to broaden the issue to ensure that people internationally are aware of these events.

World Water Forum: The World's Largest Water Event

The World Water Forum is the main water-related event in the world, aimed at putting water firmly on the international agenda. A stepping-stone towards global collaboration on water problems, the Forum offers the water community and policy-

and decision-makers from all over the world the unique opportunity to come together to create links, debate, and attempt to find solutions to achieve water security. The 5th World Water Forum will be held in Istanbul from 16 to 22 March 2009.

Archaeology

Ancient Mosaic Found in Dara Ruins, Turkey

Ancient mosaics were found in the ruins in the village of Dara, Mardin province, in October 2007. The ruins at Dara have been excavated by Professor Metin Ahunbay and his team since 1986. So far food and arms of a Byzantine military garrison have been found, as well as gravestones, an open-air theatre and rock houses. Recently, the archaeological team has announced the discovery of a mosaic with an umbrella pattern in it. The mosaic resembles the mosaics that were found in Zeugma, in Gaziantep province. It will be evaluated later on.

Dara was rebuilt by the Roman Emperor Anastasius in 505 AD, and was named after him - Anastasiopolis. It was a major Byzantine military stronghold on the border with the Sassanid Empire and played a significant part in the Roman-Persian conflicts. In his book *Mardin, Memory of Stone*, Prof Ahunbay says that the design of the city's defence walls exhibits a similarity with the military architecture of Northern Syria in late antiquity. Unfortunately, not much has survived of the city's walls. The city had a dam system, in which the river water was collected in a large pool before entering the city.

"Dara spans an area of 1.5 sq km, around which are fields that need to be excavated. The excavation will last for years," said Prof Ahunbay.

Oldest Embracing Couple Said to be Found in Turkey

An archaeological team excavating in southeast Turkey may have found the oldest known embracing couple, the 'National Geographic' reported on 17 October. The excavating team, directed by Halil Tekin of Hacettepe University in Ankara, discovered the common grave while conducting salvage digs at Hakemi Use site in Bismil district, province of Diyarbakır. The grave was found under the floor of a Neolithic house, and in it the remains of a 30-year-old man and a 20-year-old woman, dating from 6,100 BC.

Tekin suggests the couple belonged to the ancient culture of the Hassunan, which spread through Mesopotamia (modern northern Iraq) during that period. Hakemi Use is the only Hassunan site excavated within the borders of Turkey. "The way they were buried signifies that they were lovers," Tekin said to Anatolia News Agency. If Tekin's assumption is correct, it would make them the oldest embracing couple ever to be discovered.

Some scholars, however, express doubts that the remains that have been found are indeed of embracing lovers. German and Israeli experts said to the 'National Geographic' that the photograph of the skeletons does not clearly indicate the two are embracing, and that additional research is needed to confirm it.

The excavations at Hakemi Use revealed several burials from the Neolithic period, but only one of the graves contained the skeletons of a pair. The remains of the couple will be researched further by anthropologists at Hacettepe University in Ankara.

Theatre

The Orient Express Season

As part of the Orient Express Season in May 2007, multi-award winning actress Yıldız Kenter made her Arcola debut in an extraordinary one woman show *Ben, Anadolu*. The play was presented by the Arcola Theatre in London in association with Kent Oyuncuları. It was performed in Turkish followed by a question and answer session.

Güngör Dilmen, a prominent Turkish author, depicts the history of Anatolia through the perspective of women. The history of Anatolia is explained by 15 female characters: from the Roman Empress Theodora to the Turkish author Halide Edip Adıvar; from Annan Comnena, the first female historian, to Kybele, the fertility goddess of the Hittites. This powerful story weaves together time and characters to explore conflicts such as East versus West, Christian versus Muslim, and black versus white.

Other plays within the Orient Express season were *Silver Birch House* by Leyla Nazlı, *Pera Palas* by Sinan Ünel, *Saddam's Road to Hell* by Gwynne Roberts and *Natalie* by Philippe Blasband.

The Arcola Theatre was founded in September 2000 when Mehmet Ergen (the present artistic director) and Leyla Nazlı (the present Executive Producer) converted a textile factory on the borders of Stoke Newington/Dalston into one of London's largest and most adaptable fringe venues.

Arcola is now one of the country's most renowned independent theatres with a distinct and powerful identity both within the local community and in British theatre generally. Since its foundation the Arcola Theatre has won the Peter Brook Empty Space Award two years in a row and was given the Time Out Live Award twice for Inventive Programming on a Shoestring in 2003 and Favourite Fringe Venue in 2005/6. A large number of its productions have been selected as Critics' Choice in Time Out and the national papers.



Turkey and the European Union: Current Challenges and Prospects

by

William Hale

Sabancı University, Istanbul

Turkey's long-running quest to join what is now the European Union began in 1963, when it signed an Association Agreement with what was then the European Economic Community. At that time, trade and economic integration were the main items on the European agenda, and the initial goal was to establish a customs union between Turkey and the growing European community. After several upsets and blockages, this was finally achieved in 1996. For the Turks, however, the customs union was never regarded as the end of the road. Without full membership, Turkey would have

no effective role in the EU's decision-making system, and thus be forced to obey rules which it had no part in forming. For Turkey, the psychological aspect was also vital: if it were not a full member, it would be relegated to a second-class status within the European family of nations.

After years of dithering on the European side, the turning point came in December 1999 when the heads of state and government of the EU members, meeting in Helsinki as the European Council, finally decided that Turkey was entitled to begin the process of accession to full membership, provided it met the 'Copenhagen criteria' of democratic norms. Over the next six years, successive governments in Ankara completed an impressive range of reforms, including abolition of the death penalty, improved freedoms of speech and association, a constitutional reduction of the role of the military in political decision-making, and even limited recognition of the cultural rights of the Kurdish community. Impressive strides were also made in modernising the economy. Eventually, Turkey won its reward in October 2005, when accession negotiations were begun. To complete the process, Turkey has to apply each of the 35 Chapters, or policy areas, of the *acquis communautaire* – the body of common legislation covering everything from movements of goods and capital to social policy, transport, and consumer and environmental protection, on which the EU project is based. Both sides recognise that this is going to be a long and complex process, likely to last until 2013 at the very earliest, and quite probably well beyond that.

While the latest stage in Turkey's long journey to membership got off to an encouraging start between 1999 and 2005, it has seen a marked slowdown since then, as only one of the 35 Chapters has been officially 'closed', with negotiations concluded, and another six Chapters opened for negotiations. As the European Commission concluded in its most recent annual report on Turkey's progress towards accession, issued in November 2007, there had been no significant progress over the previous year.¹ The reasons for the slowdown are political, rather than economic. On the one side, conservative parties in some western European states are voicing serious doubts as to whether Turkey is sufficiently 'European' to be admitted to the EU, even if it fulfils all the Copenhagen criteria. The complex dispute over Cyprus – one of Turkey's longest-running foreign policy headaches – has also become entangled in the EU-Turkey relationship. On the other side, over the last eighteen months, the Turkish government has been dragging its feet in meeting demands for further improvements in human rights from the both the EU and liberal opinion in Turkey itself. During January-February 2008, the fierce dispute over whether women students wearing the Islamic headscarf should be admitted to universities has dominated political debate in Turkey. This is an issue on which the EU is neutral, since practices on this vary widely in the existing member states,² but the headscarf row has also distracted domestic attention from the broader need to bring Turkey into line with human rights standards which are not just 'European', but essential in any well-functioning democracy.

Within the EU, the most prominent opponents of eventual Turkish membership are the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Both prefer to offer Turkey a vaguely defined 'privileged partnership' with the Union. This Turkey would almost certainly reject, since it is likely to offer it virtually no more than the present customs union, dressed up with some rhetoric about partnership

¹ *Today's Zaman* (internet edition, www.todayszaman.com) 4 February 2008.

² *Ibid*, 22 February 2008.

between Europe and Turkey. In August 2007, however, it appeared that President Sarkozy was prepared to soften his stance, saying that he would be willing to proceed with the accession negotiations if a panel of 'wise men' were set up to decide the future boundaries of the EU (which, he apparently assumed, would exclude Turkey). So far, he has had limited success. Meeting in Brussels in December 2007, the European Council agreed to set up what was now referred to as a 'reflection group', under the former Spanish premier Filipe Gonzalez, but with the proviso that its 'reflections' were not to include Europe's future borders (what it was in fact to 'reflect' on was left obscure, and disputed by different governments).³ In return, President Sarkozy agreed that the accession process could continue, with the opening of talks on two more Chapters of the *acquis*. However, he has shown no signs of dropping his objections to Turkish membership of the EU. Paradoxically, his Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, supports the principle of eventual Turkish membership, but it is ultimately the President, not the Foreign Minister, who determines French foreign policy.

On the German side, Angela Merkel has been prepared to continue the negotiations, on the grounds that they had been started by her predecessor as Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, and she cannot go back on this. Her Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who is a member of the German Social Democrat Party (SPD), also supports Turkish accession, and Ms Merkel cannot afford an open break with him if she is to keep her coalition with the SPD going. After a meeting in New York with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan in September 2007, she announced she would not try to block negotiations, although she still favoured 'privileged partnership'.⁴ It thus appeared that both the German and French leaders were trying to postpone the point at which they could try to prevent Turkish membership until much later in the process – assuming they were both still in power and had not changed their minds by then.

This brings Turkey back to the task of trying to overcome two serious obstacles in the process. At its meeting in December 2007, the European Council welcomed the resolution of the crisis between Mr Erdoğan's government and the Turkish army, which ended with the election of Abdullah Gül as President on 28 August 2007, and the government's plans to enact a new and more liberal constitution in 2008. However, it came down heavily on the government for its lack of progress in improving the human rights regime in Turkey over the last year, in particular by not withdrawing or substantially re-writing Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. This makes 'insults' to 'Turkishness' or the main organs of the state, including the armed forces, a heavily punishable offence, and has been used to prosecute writers and intellectuals who promote dissident views on the Kurdish or Armenian questions. The EU has warned the Turkish government on this issue for well over a year, but the government has so far failed to act, in spite of repeated promises to do so by Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül. Moreover, for the EU, this is only the most immediate item in a much broader agenda. In its latest 'Accession Partnership Document' for Turkey, which was endorsed by a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers on 18 February 2008, the Union calls on Turkey to enact a programme of reforms over the next three to four years. These include measures to ensure the rule of law, human rights, citizenship and political rights, economic and minority rights, especially in the cultural field, as well as effective control over the military by parliament.⁵ Progress

³ *The Economist*, 22 December 2007, p.48.

⁴ *Today's Zaman* 27 September 2007.

⁵ Website of NTV television (www.ntvmsnbc.com) 18 February 2008.

on these issues would not remove objections to Turkish membership by President Sarkozy and others, but it would greatly strengthen the hand of the many governments in the EU which are trying to help Turkey to achieve its goal.⁶

Arguments over Turkey's relations with the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus are another bone of contention between Ankara and Brussels, but one for which the blame lies more on the European rather than the Turkish side. At its Helsinki summit in December 1999 the European Council made the crucial mistake of declaring that the Republic of Cyprus could join the EU even if there was no prior agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to re-unite the island. In 2004, Mr Erdoğan's government took the bold step of reversing previous hard-line policies on Cyprus, by supporting the plan launched by Kofi Annan, then the United Nations Secretary-General, for a bi-communal federal republic, in which the two communities would share power. In referendums held in April 2004, this was supported by the Turkish Cypriot voters, but rejected by the Greek Cypriots and their government. Due to its previous undertaking, the EU was nevertheless obliged to admit Cyprus into the EU in the following month, without the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey was also required to sign and ratify an additional protocol to its existing customs union agreement with the EU. Among other things, this would require it to open its harbours and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft. This it refuses to do, arguing that this would be tantamount to recognition. Hence, although Mr Erdoğan's government signed the protocol in 2005, it has refused to submit it to parliament for ratification. In April 2004 EU leaders undertook to lift the existing EU embargo on direct trade with the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Turkish government proposes that the additional protocol could be ratified if the EU fulfils this pledge. However, Brussels has failed to do so, thanks to Greek Cypriot objections. Not unreasonably, the Turks complain that, having done what the international community asked of them, they have received nothing in return.

As a result of the deadlock over the additional protocol, in December 2006 the European Council decided to suspend negotiations on eight of the 35 Chapters of the *acquis communautaire*. A ray of hope that this long-running dispute might be settled appeared on 17 February 2008, when the incumbent Greek-Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos, who had persistently objected to any realistic plan to settle the Cyprus problem, was unexpectedly eliminated in the first round of the latest presidential elections. At the time of writing, it was unclear whether his successor would be Ioannis Cassoulides, of the right-wing DISY party, or Dimitris Christofias, of the leftist AKEL. However both of them have indicated that they are willing to re-start the negotiation process with the TRNC President, Mehmet Ali Talat. This, in turn, could end the log-jam over the additional protocol. Such an outcome is far from certain, however, and would take some time to achieve.

Given all these problems, it is not surprising that, according to opinion polls, support for eventual EU membership among the Turkish public has fallen to below 50%, from a high of around 75% previously. In spite of this, the government seems determined to press on with its application, given the substantial economic and political gains it could reap from EU membership. Liberal opinion in Turkey, as well as the Kurdish minority, strongly favours membership, since it would lock Turkey into western democratic practices. On the EU side, while there are strong voices of dissent, there is

⁶ See, e.g., the interview with Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner responsible for enlargement, in *Radikal*, internet edition (www.radikal.com.tr) 9 October 2007.

still support for eventual Turkish accession in the Commission and among the governments of such countries as Britain, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Poland. European supporters of the Turkish bid argue, among other things, that it is essential to embrace the Muslim world's only lasting democracy, helping to overcome the Muslim-western divide both internationally and within their own societies. The strong growth of the Turkish economy, if it continues, should also strengthen the case for Turkish accession.

To ensure that the accession process is not stalled, both sides need to take urgent steps. On the European side, better public diplomacy is needed. In particular, the Commission needs to stress to the Turkish public, through the media, that the opponents of Turkish accession in Europe are in the minority, and that the Union as a whole is still committed to admitting Turkey eventually. If this is done effectively, then the frequently voiced complaint on the Turkish side, to the effect that the EU members do not want Turkey to be admitted to their club, and that there is therefore no point in pushing the process forward, will lose its force. There are fears that when France takes over the presidency of the European Council in the second half of 2008, then the accession process will grind to a halt. However, as Marc Pieri, the Head of the European Commission's Delegation in Ankara, remarked on 21 February, 'we have a well-defined road map and clear targets regarding accession talks, and this is a decision which the European Council agreed on two and a half years ago'. He added: 'France... has a serious responsibility in this regard.'⁷

On the Turkish side, the government must stir itself to push through long-promised improvements in human rights, notably those affecting freedom of speech and the rights of minorities. On 20 February 2008 the Turkish parliament finally passed a long-delayed 'Law on Foundations'. This went some way to meeting complaints by the Christian community in Turkey that activities by their communal organisations were illegitimately restricted, and that church property which had been sequestered by the state should be returned.⁸ The new law was not perfect,⁹ but was nonetheless welcomed by Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement, as a 'welcome step forward'.¹⁰ Meanwhile, it was reported that the state broadcaster, TRT, was preparing to meet Kurdish demands for more cultural rights by launching a Kurdish-language TV channel, in place of the very limited Kurdish-language broadcasting which had begun in 2004.¹¹ The Executive Board of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was also reported to have approved a reformed version of Article 301 of the Penal Code. This would apparently remove the word 'Turkishness', replacing it with 'the Turkish nation' - falling well short of calls from the EU and liberal opinion at home that the Article as a whole should be withdrawn. However, prosecutions would not be launched without the approval of the President, making it less likely that the notorious cases of the recent past would be repeated.¹² On 17 February, Prime Minister Erdoğan pledged that the government would press ahead with changes to Article 301, as well as a badly needed Social Security Law, but

⁷ Quoted, *Hürriyet*, internet edition (www.hurriyet.com.tr) 23 February 2008.

⁸ For the details, see NTV website, 21 February 2008. The law had originally been passed by the previous Turkish parliament, but had been returned to the House by the then President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, in November 2006.


⁹ In particular, church properties which had been sequestered by the state and then sold on to third parties would not be returned: *Hürriyet*, 21 February 2008.

¹⁰ Quoted, *ibid*.

¹¹ *Today's Zaman*, 21 February 2008.

¹² *Turkish Daily News*, internet edition (www.turkishdailynews.com.tr) 22 February 2008.

failed to give any details.¹³ Much will also depend on the wording of the promised new constitution, which is still unclear. Admittedly, the Turkish government has been talking the right talk, but it still has to prove that it is walking the walk on these vital issues.



Cyprus in 1972: What the historians do not tell us

by Hartmut Blankenstein

German Diplomat in Cyprus in 1971/72

German Ambassador to Oman 2002-2006

German Ambassador at Large in Afghanistan 2007

Like a thunderbolt out of the clear blue skies of the summer of 1974, the Turkish invasion struck peace-loving, abundant, multicultural Cyprus, which was enjoying its young independence under a benevolent patriarch, after the long years of repression under the Ottomans and the British.

That was how President – and Archbishop – Makarios presented the demise of his republic after the Turkish intervention of 20 July 1974 to the United Nations Security Council in New York, and that has also become the perception adopted by the media and even by some of the official historical accounts, also by the books used in schools (probably not only in Greece), and finally even by Brussels bureaucrats and EU politicians; a perception of the Turkish action as the unprovoked, illegal act of violence committed by a state which was intent on nationalist expansion.

Many of those taking such a position do so despite their better knowledge – the events of 1963/64, which led to the breakdown of the 1960 constitution and even to the first UN peacekeeping forces being stationed in Cyprus, were comprehensively documented in the press and in the records of UN debates. Others may have chosen,

¹³ *Hürriyet*, 17 February 2008.

either because they were not interested, or because they had had enough of Cypriot antagonisms, to ignore the fact that it was not just strife among Greeks in 1974 that brought about the Turkish intervention, and that the Turkish right of intervention had already from 1963 onwards dominated all events in and around Cyprus; any political considerations at the time were bound to take into account the obvious point that Turkey was not keeping her intervention forces on constant alert in the south of Turkey without reason.

A few notes regarding the incredible events of 1972 may help to shed some light on developments in Cyprus, for they are also scarcely mentioned nowadays and are probably intended to be consigned to oblivion because they are at odds with the prevailing, skilfully manipulated idea of the 'Turkish aggression'. Nevertheless, they show the enormity of the provocations to which the Turkish guarantor position in Cyprus was repeatedly exposed.

The island was already de facto split three ways in 1972. It was only in the Greek Cypriot area that the Greek Cypriot government of the 'Republic of Cyprus' was able to exercise a monopoly of power. The British base areas Dhekelia and Akrotiri were under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. No Greek Cypriots were allowed on an individual basis to enter the many Turkish enclaves, especially the large one in the north between Nicosia and Kyrenia. The Turkish Cypriots' own administration and the fighters of the Turkish Defence Organisation (TMT) strictly controlled their territory. Special roads were built by the Greek Cypriots to bypass the Turkish Cypriot sector in the north, and Greek Cypriots were only permitted to traverse this sector directly, by car, twice daily in a convoy several kilometres long under strict UN control and escort.

On the way through this convoy corridor one could see the large areas occupied by simple refugee huts which had been built by the Turkish Cypriot authorities after 1964 for the Turkish Cypriots who had fled their threatened homes. This accommodation had been provided with money from Ankara in order to prevent the large scale emigration or evacuation of Turkish Cypriots. After 1964 no Greek Cypriot was allowed to enter the Turkish sector – a situation which lasted till 2003 – whereas from 1968 onwards Turkish Cypriots were again able to enter the Greek Cypriot area – as something like 'guest workers' – to relieve the labour shortage.

Though official intercommunal talks took place between the two communities progress was desperately slow. The President and Ethnarch Makarios did not allow himself to be identified with them and left the negotiations to his colleague, Glafkos Klerides.

Then on 2 March 1972, and again more forcefully on 27 March 1972, the three bishops of the Cypriot Orthodox Church, together with the Orthodox Archbishop of Athens and all Greece, Hieronymus, presented Archbishop Makarios with an ultimatum to resign from his office as Head of State and threatened, if he refused, to remove him as Archbishop. Among their reasons was that he had exercised his temporal authority in a way which was against the Greek national interest and against the interests of the Church by trying to create a separate 'Cyprus consciousness'. Furthermore they claimed that he was responsible for the Church's loss of prestige,

for the spreading of nihilism and atheism, for the growth of communism, and for the strengthening of the Turkish position (in that order!).

Their main argument in short was that the policy of 'the feasible' pursued by Makarios was at odds with the ideal of ENOSIS and would lead to the separation of Cyprus from the motherland (the 'national trunk'). The Metropolitans repeated their demand for his resignation on 1 July 1972 and gave the Archbishop (and President) a limit of ten days within which to make his decision.

This onslaught is only comprehensible in the light of the political confrontation between Athens and Nicosia. Makarios, with his policy of independence, his National Guard of 30,000 men, and his negative attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots, was an obstacle to the policy of stability between Athens and Ankara and to Greece's claim to exercise a Pan-Hellenic hegemony. In this situation Athens was easily able to get the Metropolitans on its side. However, Makarios's reaction to this concerted action by the Greek colonels and the Metropolitans was not the one expected.

Before the ten days were up Makarios rejected the attacks clearly and decisively: "With the wolves swooping down the shepherd does not desert the sheep and flee." He emerged from the confrontation backed by a vast number of expressions of loyalty and support from the Greek Cypriot community.

The rift between the Makarios government and Athens grew deeper, but other countries were solidly behind Makarios. Many third world countries, where Cyprus and especially President Makarios were greatly respected, sent messages of support.

What was more significant, however, was that the West did not stand idly by while these manoeuvres to oust the President took place. The United States, which would have been greatly disturbed by a new source of unrest in the Mediterranean in 1972, at a time when the trend was towards relaxation of tension and the disbanding of overseas commitments, at once informed the Athens government that they were extremely keen on the maintenance of peace and security on the south east flank of NATO. The United Kingdom, which was inevitably concerned about the continued existence of its sovereign bases every time there was trouble in Cyprus, intervened in a similar vein.

And Turkey? Observers of and participants in dealings with Turkey in 1972 agreed that militarily only a coup by rabidly nationalist groups could lead to the ousting of the President. The violent removal of a constitutionally elected Head of State would constitute the brutal undermining of the principles of western democracy by nationalist and clerical putschists. Moreover this would not solve the problem of what should come after Makarios. I summed up political discussions with Turkish diplomats on this point in a note of August 1972 as follows:

If those who may carry out the putsch were to try, after the deposition of Makarios, to replace him with a colourless puppet, that would probably result in a chaotic internal situation, if not in civil war. The harshest measures would then have to be taken against an obstreperous and recalcitrant population, which would

carry on supporting Makarios and would also be well armed from previous situations (eg the EOKA campaign). For all the lip service paid to ENOSIS, the communists, and also large sections of the public at large, would strongly resist indirect rule by the colonels' regime in Athens. And above all, if there were disturbances resembling civil war within the Greek Cypriot community, the Turks would try, on the grounds of ensuring the security interests of their 'compatriots' living in isolated, purely Turkish villages or in mixed villages, to achieve the partition of the island by expanding the enclaves which they are already administering.

There was, therefore, no full outbreak of conflict between on the one hand the Athens colonels and their chauvinistic partners in Nicosia, and on the other President Makarios. Two years later, however, the radical Pan-Hellenes in Greek Cyprus could be restrained no longer and, by deposing Makarios, they destroyed once and for all the constitutional system in Cyprus, a system which to be sure had existed only on paper from as far back as 1963. This resulted almost automatically in a development which had already been on the cards for years and which led to the division of the island, a division which has nowadays become institutionalised.

Translated from the German
by John Martin

Update on Cyprus

by Clement Dodd

Professorial Research Associate, School of Oriental & African Studies

It is often said that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in London enjoy good relations with each other and that this is an indication of how well they would get along in a reunified Cyprus. This image took a dent when on 3 July 2007 the 'National Federation of Cypriots in the UK' held a meeting in the House of Commons that was addressed by speakers from Parliament of the Greek Cypriot persuasion. Uninvited though he was, despite his strong interests in Cyprus, Lord Maginnis nevertheless attended the meeting. The few Turkish Cypriots there were not allowed to speak, but Lord Maginnis was allowed a few words. When he referred to the 1974 Turkish military intervention as a justifiable peace operation, the meeting, in his words, 'descended into chaos'. He said, 'I had never before experienced such racist bigotry and hatred for Turkish people as I saw that night.'¹⁴ This sort of intolerance, which is quite frequently witnessed in Cyprus, does not help the UN bring together those on both sides who genuinely want to see a solution of the Cyprus problem.

¹⁴ *News and Views about Northern Cyprus* (London: Office of the TRNC Representative, June/July, 2007)

UN Negotiations

In July 2006 the UN did manage to persuade the two sides to agree to talks in Cyprus on practical issues that would lead, it was hoped, to wider agreements. Whilst officials on both sides have met regularly to find points of accord, there has not been enough progress for the two presidents to meet, though President Talat has frequently, but vainly, called for meetings with President Papadopoulos. Eventually, in July 2007, Papadopoulos did agree to meet with his opposite number, only then for Talat to cancel the meeting. This was because under pressure from the Cypriot Football Association, Luton Town Football Club cancelled a match with a Turkish Cypriot team to be held in North Cyprus. With the aid of UN officials a new meeting of the two presidents was successfully arranged for 5 September, a meeting strongly supported by the Greek Cypriot National Council. All that it achieved, however, was disagreement, accusation and counter-accusation. Talat wanted five committees on specific topics to meet to prepare for full-fledged negotiations to solve the problem in 2008. Papadopoulos did not want any deadline for the work of the committees because it 'would accelerate finalizing the fact that there was a deadlock'.¹⁵ The Greek Cypriot government's spokesman said that Talat's aim 'was to bring negotiations back to the Annan Plan . . . and to further the secessionist aims of the pseudo-state'.¹⁶ In the South commentators saw Papadopoulos' agreement to meet Talat as a tactic to further his chances in the presidential election to be held in February 2008.

The Greek Cypriot Presidential Election 2008

In July the coalition supporting Papadopoulos' government fell apart when the leader of the notionally communist party, AKEL, Demetris Christofias, decided to stand for president. Ioannis Kasoulides from the right-wing, and moderately nationalist, Democratic Rally (DISY) also announced his candidature, as finally did Papadopoulos. In early polls Papadopoulos had a slight edge, but a poll in January 2008 showed him to be losing ground. Kasoulides has surprisingly moved into first place, with Christofias a few points behind. They are all only percentage points apart. A run-off election seems certain since more than half of the votes is required for outright victory. The pundits believe Christofias or Kasoulides will win, though it is by no means certain. The UN, Britain, and the United States are clearly hoping Christofias or Kasoulides will be successful since they both profess support for a federal solution.

Politics in the TRNC

To return to July 2007, one development that was welcomed by both Talat and the Greek Cypriot government was the resounding victory of Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party on 22 July in the Turkish parliamentary elections. The Greek Cypriots regarded this as a defeat for the Turkish military, whom they always see as the force behind Turkish policy on Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot government hopes, and expects, that the election of a government intent still on EU membership will induce Ankara to force concessions on the Turkish Cypriots. In the North the nationalist right, represented by the National Unity Party and the Democratic Party favour a two-state solution. They could only take some modest comfort from the Turkish elections in that the sympathetic Nationalist Action Party won a substantial number of seats in

¹⁵ *Cyprus News*, 217 (London: The Cyprus High Commission, 1-30 September, 2007).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

the new parliament and that the People's Party maintained its place. However Erdoğan, with a substantial majority, does not have to rely on either.

In the North the political situation has been long disrupted by the continuing boycott of parliament by the two right-wing nationalist parties in protest against the emergence, with suspected Turkish assistance, of the miniscule Freedom and Reform Party.¹⁷ Consequently there has been no effective parliamentary opposition, which has led to some general dissatisfaction. The more important National Unity Party led by Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, has allegedly been disturbed and weakened by the renewed influence within it of its former hard-line leader, Derviş Eroğlu. On 10 January 2008, however, the party decided to return to parliament. They want new elections, but the Prime Minister, Ferdi Sabit Soyer, has said that there will be no elections in 2008.

Strengthened by Erdoğan's victory, Soyer and Talat continue to advocate a federal solution. Talat has always refused to call for recognition of the TRNC, but in recent speeches he has been hinting that if there is no progress towards a federal solution, recognition will have to come. In this regard President Gül, on a visit to the TRNC, stressed that the two states were the basis of a solution, and pointed to the differences in language and religion that separated the two peoples. This was resented by the Greek Cypriots, for whom all are Cypriots, no matter what their religion or language. However, a two-state solution is now in the air. Interestingly, on a recent formal visit to Turkey Talat was entertained to a lunch in his honour attended by ambassadors from Islamic countries. These could be the first to ignore the UN and recognise a Turkish Cypriot state, should that come to be an option.

Turkish Cypriot Isolation

It was regarded by the Greek Cypriots as an important dent in their almost universally acknowledged claim to sovereignty over all the island when, on 23 October 2007, the Prime Ministers of the UK and Turkey announced a Strategic Partnership Agreement that included Cyprus. One section of the Agreement was devoted to ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Very alarmingly for the Greek Cypriots both Britain and Turkey agreed (i) to work within the UN, the EU and bilaterally, to promote direct commercial, economic, political and cultural contacts between the UK, the EU and the Turkish Cypriots, (ii) to maintain high level contacts with the Turkish Cypriot authorities, (iii) to provide continued help for 'TRNC' authorities/universities in the Bologna process, and (iv) to uphold the right to representation of the Turkish Cypriots in the European Parliament. Britain also signified its intention to bring Turkish Cypriots closer to Europe and to prepare for a future settlement.¹⁸

The Greek Cypriot response was one of outrage. A high-level meeting of British and Greek Cypriot ministers to be held in Paphos was cancelled, as was the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister's projected visit to London. Called to the Greek Cypriot Foreign Office, the British High Commissioner said that there was no change in British policy of non-recognition of the TRNC. This was dismissed as disingenuous. The de-linking of embargoes and recognition is not accepted. The Greek Cypriots do not want the Taiwan type of solution that seems to be the aim of the Turkish-British Agreement, but it seems they will be under pressure to move in that direction. It would immediately ameliorate customs union difficulties between Turkey and Cyprus and allow Turkey's EU membership negotiations to move ahead more smoothly, whilst leaving the recognition problem for the future.

¹⁷ As reported in 'Update on Cyprus' in this *Review*, No. 9, Spring 2007.

¹⁸ The full text is included in the *Friends of Cyprus Report*, 50, Winter, 2007-2008.

Papadopoulos said he wanted to believe that the agreement was not drafted as revenge for the 1931 revolt or the 1955 EOKA struggle! It was interesting that the Greek Cypriot reaction to similar decisions taken earlier by the German Government to help the Turkish Cypriots had evoked much less hostility. Not only was Britain a Guarantor Power of the Republic of Cyprus; it also had vulnerable and unpopular sovereign military bases, a reminder of colonial status. There were the usual unofficial threats to the bases. A new student group was formed to protest against their presence. Later, in January 2008, there was a vicious attack on the police guarding the bases, though not necessarily by the same group.

During the period under review the Greek Cypriots have not found it easy to assert with success everywhere their recognised sovereignty over both parts of Cyprus, or to escape criticism from abroad. They have not so far been able to halt a new ferry service from Gazimağusa/Famagusta to Latakia in Syria. So far Syria has not paid heed to their requests to end it. The Greek Cypriot government appealed to the EU, but was told that there was nowhere any international prohibition on the use of ports in Northern Cyprus. More important, in November 2007 the High Court in London gave permission for Cyprus Turkish Airlines and CTA Holidays to challenge legally the British Government's rejection of their demand for direct flights to North Cyprus.

To add to the Greek Cypriots' discomfiture over the issue of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, in his Report to the Security Council (3 December 2007) the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, wrote: 'It is regrettable that the ongoing debate on lifting the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots has become one of recognition. . . . The maintenance of economic, social, cultural, sporting, or similar ties does not amount to recognition.' The Greek Cypriot government objected. Its spokesman, Vassilis Palmas, responded: 'We must put an end to this myth . . . there is no isolation of Turkish Cypriots, either as individuals, or collectively as a community.' AKEL's leader, Christofias explained how this really was the case, saying that Cyprus never objected to trade between the North and other countries as long as the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus was involved. He meant (to spell it out) that there was no objection as long as trade went through Greek Cypriot ports with whatever 'Cypriot' documentation was required. Responding to the Secretary-General's Report, the Security Council in its subsequent Resolution (789), which was influenced by Russia, omitted the Secretary-General's views. This was pleasing for the Greek Cypriots, but they are clearly under pressure to distinguish lifting embargoes from the issue of recognition. Wishing, perhaps, not to force the Greek Cypriots into too tight a corner, Britain and the United States also voted for the omission of the offending words.

Criticism of Papadopoulos at Home and Abroad

In August 2007 the influential Brussels-based think-tank, the International Crisis Group, chaired by Chris Patten and the American diplomat, Thomas Pickering, criticised Papadopoulos for his intransigent attitudes, and claimed evidence showed that the policy of osmosis developed by the Greek Cypriot government to seduce the Turkish Cypriots into submission was unlikely to work. In the South the maverick politician and member of the European Parliament, Marios Matsakis, made headlines and created alarm by saying that a two-state solution would be better than a new Annan Plan, though he seemed optimistically to believe that this offer, if made, would be enough to ensure the return of Güzelyurt/Morphou and Famagusta. It has not escaped notice in the South and abroad that a recent poll in the North showed that 60

per cent of Turkish Cypriots now want a two-state solution, and might well not support a revised Annan Plan. Even Talat has admitted that the people on both sides no longer envisage union.¹⁹ Nevertheless Britain's newly appointed Special Representative for Cyprus, Joan Ryan MP, visiting Cyprus in October, said that Britain was very serious indeed in working with the UN, with Cypriots, and with all those who seek the reunification of the island.²⁰ On 4 October President Gül in Strasbourg described Turkish policy in similar terms. However, allegedly well-informed press reports in Turkey claim that the Turkish Government has two policies ready, one for a federation if Christofias or Kasoulides wins the presidential election, and one for a two-state solution should the anti-Annan Papadopoulos come out the victor.

Future Prospects

All must now wait on the outcome of the presidential election in the South. President Talat believes that 2008 will be a decisive year for Cyprus. Similar views have been expressed about other years in the past, but he may be right. There is now considerable pressure on the Greek Cypriots. They see with some alarm the impending declaration of independence by Kosovo, with no certainty that it will not be recognised by the United States and others, even if Cyprus persuades the EU not to go so far, or prevents it from doing so.

The signs are that there will be a new attempt at a federal plan sponsored by the United Nations. However, the situation in Northern Cyprus is now very different from 2004. The Güzelyurt/Morphou area has been greatly developed and will not easily be forfeited. The property problem is more complex, now that there has been so much development of the land and property that the Greek Cypriots, or their heirs, claim is theirs. Many more Turkish immigrants have become Turkish Cypriot citizens and could not be obliged to return to Turkey. Even if these problems were overcome, there would be the difficulty of making a lop-sided two-member federal government work successfully when mutual trust is as yet anything but obvious. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister, Soyer, has recently expressed renewed confidence in the possibility of a negotiated federal reunion on the grounds that the North is now much stronger economically. To many both in the North and the South this looks like fanning the embers of a fire too long left to die.



The moral duty owed by
Britain
to the quiet Muslims kept
in purdah by
the high priests of Cyprus

¹⁹ Interview with Athens newspaper, *To Vima*, reported in *Halkın Sesi*, 2 October 2007.

²⁰ As reported in the *Cyprus Mail*, 8 October 2007.

Extract from 'Parliamentary Brief', October 2007, by Michael Stephen
Conservative MP 1992-97, Author of *The Cyprus Question*, Member of the R.I.I.A (Chatham House)

‘Cyprus is a case of Christian fundamentalism versus moderate
Islam.

We should be supporting the moderate Muslims, but we are not’

The Eastern Mediterranean is important in relation to Iran, Iraq, Israel, the Gulf, the Caspian, and the Middle East generally. British trading interests, whilst small in Cyprus itself, require stability in the region. Violations of human rights and breakdown of respect and understanding between peoples in the region threaten our foreign policy interests. Britain has military bases in Cyprus, and the island is a sensitive issue in relations between Britain, Turkey and the European Union.

The driving force behind Greek Cypriot actions on the Cyprus issue was, and still is, the Greek Orthodox Church, which dreams of Hellenising Cyprus and annexing it to Greece. They will encourage the appearance of negotiations, but will never accept a settlement which could be acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. Their influence was a major factor in the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of the Annan Plan in 2004.

The church is immensely rich and politically powerful in southern Cyprus, but there is no comparable force in the north. Although most Turkish Cypriots are Muslims they rarely attend the mosque, and their religious leaders have no political power. Cyprus is a case of Christian fundamentalism versus moderate Islam. Similarly, the church and Greek Cypriot businessmen spend huge sums to influence politicians, especially in Britain and the US, but the Turkish Cypriots cannot match those resources.

For the past 44 years the Turkish Cypriots have been living under international isolation, which they have never deserved.

David Miliband, at the Labour Conference, said he had been told that “millions of Muslims around the world think we’re seeking not to empower them but to dominate them.” He also said, “Europe can’t be a closed Christian club.” Britain should be supporting the moderate Muslims in Cyprus, but we are not. The Greek Cypriot government, with British support, gained entry to the EU in 2004, claiming to represent the whole of Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriots were left outside.

Today the Greek Cypriot ‘Government of Cyprus’ controls all the Cyprus embassies, and prevents the Turkish Cypriots trading directly with the world; they prevent direct flights to airports in the north of Cyprus. They exclude the Turkish Cypriot voice from the councils of the world (including the UK political party conferences). They will not allow Turkish Cypriot teams to participate in international sport; they try to prevent access by the Turkish Cypriots to international funding and expertise to protect the heritage and environment; they complain that churches in the north are in disrepair, whilst bulldozing mosques and Muslim shrines in the south, and they are trying to prevent European recognition of Turkish Cypriot universities within the Bologna process.

In April 2004, the United Nations’ Annan Plan for a Cyprus settlement was endorsed by the whole world as a fair and reasonable compromise. The Turkish Cypriots accepted it, despite the fact that it contained considerable risks for them, but the Greek

Cypriots rejected it. They were entitled to reject it, but having done so, they cannot expect the world to assist them to keep the Turkish Cypriots in isolation. The Plan would have removed almost all the Greek and Turkish troops from the island and would have allowed many of the Greek Cypriots to return to their former homes in the north, with compensation for the rest.

On 26 April 2004, the European Council said: ‘The Turkish Cypriots have expressed their clear desire for a future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community.’ They have not yet done so.

On 18 May 2004 Prime Minister Blair said: “It is important that we end the isolation of northern Cyprus... That means lifting the embargoes in respect to trade, and in respect to air travel.” The UK Government has not yet done so, and the Turkish Cypriots have had to take the question of direct flights to the English courts, which should decide within the next few months.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons reported on 1 February 2005 that ‘undertakings given to Turkish Cypriots by the international community must be honoured. We recommend that the (UK) Government do more to turn its words into action’.

It is now more than three years since the Turkish Cypriots accepted the Annan Plan, but they still suffer the isolation which they have had to endure for 44 years. Why? Because nobody wants to risk offending the Greek Cypriots – but it is time for this to change. The Greek Cypriots must no longer be allowed to keep the Turkish Cypriots in isolation. It would be wholly unreasonable to expect the Turkish Cypriots to wait for yet another round of UN-sponsored talks, which are currently being talked about, and all international restrictions upon them must be removed now.

If Britain’s new Prime Minister believes in the moral values which he espouses, he should start acting with honesty and decency toward the Turkish Cypriots.

In Europe, Gordon Brown should press for the full inclusion of Turkish Cypriot universities in the Bologna process and for the right of Turkish Cypriot MPs to speak in the European Parliament whenever Cyprus is considered. At the UN he should call for all countries to trade normally with northern Cyprus. In Britain he should not allow the ‘Cyprus High Commission’ to interfere in contractual relations between exhibition organisers in the UK and Turkish Cypriots who wish to organise or participate in exhibitions. He should also make it clear to the Greek Cypriots that he does not approve of their efforts to use the UK courts to settle property disputes which should have been settled through the Annan Plan or through the compensation commission which the Turkish Cypriots have established.

This would be the policy most likely to bring the parties in Cyprus to serious negotiations. The Turkish Cypriots still prefer settlement to permanent separation, but the Greek Cypriot leaders need to be convinced that the world will not tolerate restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots any longer.

If Britain's new Prime Minister believes in the moral values which he espouses, he should start acting with honesty and decency toward the Turkish Cypriots.

GGGG

TASG 2008 Annual Lecture
SOAS 25 January 2008

**Turkey and the East-West Divide:
Personal Reflections on Literature, Politics
and Education**

(shortened version)

by

Maureen Freely

Let me begin by apologising for my title. Though I have quite a bit to say about all of the subjects to which it alludes, my real subject is freedom of expression – and its assassin, censorship. My premise – and I am sure it is yours, too – is that literature, education, informed political debate and indeed democracy cannot survive unless there are spaces in which students and teachers, journalists and writers, politicians and voters can engage in a free exchange of ideas without fearing for their lives. Sadly, those spaces have been under sustained attack in Turkey over the past three years. Sadly, a lot of people who ought to have known better have gone along with it, both in Turkey and abroad. In so doing, they have aided and abetted all those who wish to keep it out of Europe. For it is thanks to the censors and their unwitting allies that most people in the West think of Turkey as a flat and monochrome Eastern cartoon.

Received opinion is that we in this country can say more or less what we like and that the Turks cannot. How did they come to this conclusion? To a large degree it is because of the prosecutions of Orhan Pamuk, Elif Şafak, and Hrant Dink, though I should add that those of us who tried to write about Hrant Dink's prosecutions will remember that it was next to impossible to run this story except as a coda to an article about his more famous friends.

It was only after his death that he became world famous.

A year and six days after his assassination, careful newspaper readers and attentive Today programme listeners know that Hrant Dink, like Orhan Pamuk and Elif Şafak, was prosecuted for 'insulting Turkishness' under Article 301 of the new penal code – the penal code that was, you will recall, originally advertised as an effort to bring Turkey into harmony with European social democratic norms. If they are very, very careful listeners, they may also know that it is far from being the only article in this code to severely curb free expression. There is also the law protecting the memory of Atatürk, and the Terrorism Law, and the various articles that make it an offence to

incite sectarian or religious hatred, insult organs of the state, or alienate the people from the military.

They will also know that many of the so-called 301 defendants were prosecuted after challenging the official Turkish position about what happened to the Ottoman Armenians in 1915. They will have heard that the Turkish state refuses to acknowledge that what was done to the Armenians of Anatolia amounted to genocide; that they were expelled from their homes and deported and systematically butchered with the intention of eradicating the race. Careful newspaper readers and BBC listeners will know, but seldom understand, why most people in Turkey believe the Armenian genocide to have been invented by the Armenian diaspora. But having noted the gap between public opinion in Turkey and public opinion here, they are quick to conclude that Turkey cannot possibly be ready to become part of the EU.

If you have any connection to Turkey, none of this will be new to you. Neither will the shape of conversations to which I am doomed if I go into a party of strangers to be introduced as ‘She grew up in Turkey!’ Or: ‘She translates Orhan Pamuk!’ Only to see the hostess fly off to greet the next guests, leaving me surrounded by a sea of gimlet eyes.

The first question is always: ‘So. Do you really think we should let them in? Is Turkey the sort of country we should be welcoming into the EU?’ I take this opportunity to remind them that they need not worry. The bar has been set very high. Turkey is not getting into the EU until it meets some very strict criteria. As the long faces get longer, I mutter a few words about the economic reforms Turkey must undertake. I go on to explain that the EU has also told Turkey it must undertake human rights reforms, and reduce the role of the army in political life, and last but not least, change its approach to minorities.

There is a cartoon image that most people in this country have of Turkey. They see Westernisation as a tide that, having reached the middle of Anatolia, is now receding as the call to prayer grows steadily louder. If they had a few more basic facts about the country – if they knew how rapidly it has urbanised over the past four decades, if they knew that Istanbul is a city of contrasts because so many of its recent immigrants come from eastern Anatolia, and that is thriving economically at least in part because the old secular bourgeoisie is now in competition with an emerging Muslim bourgeoisie that also comes out of Anatolia – they would see the lie in the cartoon.

So why don’t they have these basic facts? There are lots of reasons, but the most important one is censorship. I am not talking now about censorship as practised inside Turkey but the far less straightforward mechanisms that limit and shape coverage of Turkey in the Western press. As recently as six years ago – before the AKP came to power, before EU accession became a real possibility, before the 301 prosecutions, before the assassination of Hrant Dink – those of us wishing to write about Turkey had an even more serious problem than the one we face today. No one in the West seemed to think of Turkey as newsworthy, except, perhaps, in rooms like this. There was, of course, a steady stream of scholarly works, and travel books, and biographies, and novels. But no matter what our subject, our efforts all got the same headlines in this country’s book pages. If it wasn’t Turkish Delight it was Cold Turkey. If it wasn’t Cold Turkey it was the Beauties of the Bosphorus, the Sick Old Man of Europe, or some infernally clever play on East meeting West. I’ve had to fight a battle every single time I write on Turkey in the papers or speak about it on the BBC. So of course, I’m glad that Turkey has been rising up the news agenda in

recent years. There is more space for discussion, but no way near enough to do the job properly. And whenever a space does open up, it is riddled either with the commissioning editor's prejudices or with the arrogant assumptions that the wiser, better informed editors know their readers and listeners will bring with them. You have to address these first because if you don't, they will continue to see Turkey through the wrong end of the telescope. But that means that you have to begin where they are, and if, by some happy series of accidents, you find a way of shifting their views at all, you will have little time left over for discussing whatever it was you had hoped to discuss. And even that won't be possible unless you hold your tongue.

These are the constraints under which we who write about Turkish culture, literature and politics must operate. We have felt them most sharply during what I used to call our '301 season' – though I am now seeking another, more accurate way of describing this travesty, because the problems around free expression in Turkey are too complex to describe with a single number, and also, sadly, because the seasons keep changing and the structures that make free expression dangerous are still very much in place. As I mentioned earlier, it was very hard to get any coverage at all for 301 defendants not already known in the West. So we are talking now about Orhan Pamuk, and, to a significantly lesser degree, Elif Şafak. When they were prosecuted, they were of interest not just because they were in favour of free expression, because their cases seemed to reflect, or could be made to reflect, Western supremacist agendas. This persisted no matter what these writers said to their interviewers to challenge those agendas. So the coverage they got was often much, much worse than no coverage at all. For there is no better way to confirm a cartoon view of a country like Turkey than to illustrate a few lone stars. Once the lesser known have been pushed into the shadows, once all signs of democracy have been airbrushed out, Turkey stops looking like a troubled democracy overseen by a powerful army that sustains its hold over the country by setting severe curbs on freedom of expression. Instead it begins to look like a country in which there is no expression at all.

Having just returned from a trip to Istanbul for English PEN, I can tell you that nothing – nothing – could be further from the truth. Even today, a year and six days since the assassination of Hrant Dink. Though the accounts in the Western press about the vigil marking the first anniversary of his murder were respectful, though they did reflect the mood of those gathered on the avenue outside the offices of Agos, they did not quite convey what it was like to be there, in a crowd of 8,000 to 12,000, hemmed in by as many as 6,000 riot police, and overlooked by snipers poised on rooftops. Nor did they mention the filled-to-the-rafters Hrant Dink Memorial Lecture at Boğaziçi University.

It was Boğaziçi and two other private universities – Bilgi and Sabancı – that in 2005 organised the first ever conference by and for Turks to discuss what really happened to Anatolia's Armenians in 1915. Their hope was that they might make it possible for Turkish society to recognise the extent of the tragedy, to own it and make peace with it – to create a free space for discussion, safe from the distortions of politics. Their belief was that this process was an essential part of democratisation, a central part of its transition to social democracy. That it was bound to be a painful process was evident. By breaking a ninety-year taboo, they would, they knew, be challenging the very foundations of Turkey's national myth. But there was, they said, honour to be had in facing up to history.

When Orhan Pamuk was prosecuted for insulting Turkishness, many associated with this conference were prosecuted, too. In view of what they went on to suffer, it is sometimes difficult to remember where the confident spirit of 2005 came from. But Turkey was a very different place three years ago. It was undergoing a renaissance. Encouraged by the prospect of EU accession, it seemed ready to move beyond the monochrome, monocultural model of Turkishness that has been at the heart of the Kemalist project from the outset. In Turkey's intelligentsias, the desire to re-examine the severed roots of the past was balanced by the reluctance to have a new version of modernity imposed by Europe. They were re-engaging not just with history but with the vexed question of westernisation. There have of course been many occasions when the conversations on the Boğaziçi campus have turned into bitter arguments, and when the political implications of a foreign education have been troubling and even dangerous for students and teachers alike. Though there has never been a time when the talking has stopped, there have been moments over the past three years when the end seemed very, very close.

Last May, for example. The occasion, seen from abroad, seems innocent enough. The History and Turkish Literature Departments of Boğaziçi University decided it might be a nice idea to hold a two-day symposium on the work of Orhan Pamuk. He had, after all, won the Nobel Prize six months earlier. The first Turk ever to do so, but the literature departments of the nation had remained for the most part silent. To my knowledge only two other Turkish universities had organised events to mark the achievement. This at a time when the study of Orhan Pamuk in universities abroad was already an industry. Which is why the Boğaziçi organisers wanted theirs to be a symposium in which mostly Turkish scholars spoke about his work in Turkish. They also wanted to make a space where scholars could talk about the work of Orhan Pamuk in peace, instead of having to engage with the political storms raging around him. That said, those of us who gave papers were making something of a political statement just by being there. It is a measure of the success of the long hate campaign waged against him in the tabloid press that most members of the Turkish intelligentsias, like most people in the general public, continue to think of him as a writer who has shirked his duty, as a Turk who sold his country to Europe to advance his career.

But he has his friends. By holding this symposium, his friends at Boğaziçi hoped to cut through the politics, to honour the literature, and in so doing, to prove the hate campaigners wrong. In was in this same spirit that they also offered him an honorary degree. And he came to accept it, bringing with him the squad of police guards that he must have with him at all times whenever he is in Turkey. There in the audience to applaud him were a number of other 301 defendants who had also been put under mandatory 24-hour police guard. It has not always been clear if these police guards are there to protect them, or to watch them, or to make them think twice before they speak out on sensitive issues once marked as taboo. But we do now know that death threats were not empty, and not originating in extreme organisations based in remote Anatolian cities. I am referring, of course, to the arrests this week of 33 members of Ergenekon, who, we are told, were not just implicated in the Susurluk scandal, but also in the assassination of Hrant Dink, and a high court judge, and a Catholic priest. Amongst them was Kemal Kerinçsiz, the ultranationalist lawyer who initiated the most famous 301 prosecutions. If what we have heard is correct, they were planning to assassinate Orhan Pamuk, and several journalists, as well as a number of Kurdish politicians, including Leyla Zana. They were going to organise other provocations,

too, with a view to creating the sort of turbulence that might justify a coup in a year's time.

The aim of the prosecutions was never to send people to jail. It was to use the prosecutions as photo opportunities, for themselves, for their hired assassins, and their ideas. It has been extraordinarily successful in this regard, working in parallel with Europe's ultranationalists to turn a country that was overwhelmingly pro-EU into a country that is largely against it. For three years the ultranationalists and their media friends played and played and played on modern Turkey's fears and sensitivities. For three years, they reported, distorted, and exaggerated every negative thing said against Turkey in Europe. For three years, they monitored every little thing that the 301 defendants said when they went abroad, seizing upon and twisting their words, and where necessary, planting disinformation. For three years, they beat the Western media at their own game, dazzling it with its own prejudices and cartoon images. And most people were fooled. Even people who ought to have known better.

But perhaps we've been given another chance now. A year and six days after we lost Hrant Dink, perhaps we are finally ready to learn from his death. Perhaps we have learned how important it is for us to cherish and protect the spaces in which free expression is possible, even and especially when people are exploring ideas and histories that we would prefer to ignore. Perhaps we will conclude that without those free spaces, literature cannot flourish, political debate flattens and disappears, education cannot even begin.

And then, perhaps, we can look into the empty spaces that censorship makes possible, and see how, in the absence of real information, in the absence of a free exchange of ideas, dangerous ideologies take root in them. The myth of the East-West divide is one of the most dangerous. But now, perhaps, those of us who see through it will resolve to overcome our other divisions, and work together to prove it wrong.

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Interviews



Interview with H.E. Yiğit Alpogan

**Turkish Ambassador to the
Court of St James**

Interviewed by Arın Bayraktaroğlu on 11 December 2007

AB: Your Excellency, on behalf of the Turkish Area Study Group I would like to start by welcoming you to London and wishing you well. May I ask if there are any new ideas you are planning to introduce to the work of your office?

H.E.: Since I arrived in London one of the areas we have been working in is to make our embassy a 'transparent' and accessible place. I am aware that this is not an easy task but we will do our utmost to create an office which endeavours to establish as many links with the outside world as possible. I have been in touch with various establishments and when required I give information about the views and policies of the Turkish government. To introduce some variety to our contacts, I have decided to get in touch with some of the national think-tanks, for instance Wilton Park, which is one of the world's leading centres for the discussion of international issues. This of course does not mean that there are only a few such institutions in the UK, but I would like to activate our resources by means of establishing cooperation with a limited number of such centres at the start. We will hold meetings with the managements of these institutions or with their selected officials and I will relay my views to them. My embassy would also be prepared to help in bringing out speakers from Turkey for their seminars or in holding conferences.

Another type of institution that we are interested in establishing contacts with are the universities. There are many excellent universities in the UK. Despite this, for our pilot work, I have only chosen four of them. A common feature is that these are all places where some degree of Turkish Studies is carried out. On our visits we will evaluate the possibilities of our contribution to their Turkish Studies programmes. There is SEESOX in Oxford, being a division within the European Studies Centre. I have visited them and talked to those in charge as well as to the Turkish researchers who have been carrying out academic work there. Tomorrow my visit will take me to LSE, where the Contemporary Turkish Studies chair is held by Professor Şevket Pamuk. We will review the situation to find out ways in which my embassy and the department can interact. Following this, I will visit SOAS, where a student sponsored by the Turkish Foreign Office is working for a PhD degree, so we have an 'organic' kind of link already in place with SOAS. We are contacting these places to inform them that we are ready to cooperate at all levels and to investigate how best we can be of help. Last but not least I would like to visit Cambridge to see what can be done there.

The purpose of these visits is to remind the institutions in the UK with an interest in Turkey that there is a Turkish Embassy in London, and that we are interested in helping them so that this would lead to some useful cooperation. Similarly in this context, we can talk to the officers of your organisation, if they are agreeable. We will be happy to support your activities and to start a beneficial and effective relationship. I consider your present visit as the starting point of collaboration.

AB: Thank you very much indeed Your Excellency. I am sure that our members will be extremely happy to hear about your plans and especially that your Embassy could support our activities.

Would you be kind enough to let us have your views about Turkey's foreign relations. Of primary interest among these is the fact that accession to the

European Union has for many years not ceased to be in the limelight in Turkey. The process seems to be an open-ended one, as new obstacles are constantly being created, and, as a result, there is an on-going message given to Turkey that she is not yet ready to join the Union. I was invited last September by the Committee of the Regions of the EU to voice my views, for what they are worth, at a working session held in Brussels. The concern of the working party was centred on the question as to whether it would be easy for Turkish culture to be integrated into the European way of living. The impression I received on the day was that there was still a long way for Turkey to go before she could join the Union. May I ask for your views on this matter? What needs to be done in order to shorten this waiting period?

H.E.: Thank you. The history of Turkey's decision for westernization is a considerably long one. Turkey's recent desire to be a part of the EU fits well into this long history. Of course, conditions required of the other member countries will be demanded of Turkey as well, but unfortunately additional conditions are being put forward for Turkey's accession, such as those related to Cyprus. We will solve all these issues. I strongly believe that Turkey is determined to make all the changes that other member countries have implemented. Our economy is strong. Indeed, when compared with some of the other countries, the economy in Turkey is much stronger. Turkey is a country with a current trading volume worth 260 billion dollars. It is an up and coming country of 70 million with a young population. Furthermore, due to her strategic positioning, it is an important country. We will, of course, become a member of the European Union, but 'Europeanism' will be only one of our characteristics. Turkey is in Europe but also in the Balkans, in the Caucasus and she neighbours on the Middle East. Bearing these multi-faceted features, she is in a position to build a bridge for Europe to reach these locations and increase its influence in these areas. When Turkey becomes a part of the EU, it is not only Turkey that will benefit from this accession, as claimed in some of the sterile discussions taking place in Europe. The Union will benefit equally, if not more than Turkey, from this accession.

If the accession process continues without further disruptions, and I believe this could be achieved – in politics things can change overnight – Turkey could be a member on 1 January 2014 at the start of the next seven year budget for the Union. However, this is not something Turkey can manage on her own. Unfortunately there may be some discouraging developments, as we have recently seen in Europe, which are designed to block Turkey's way. Such are the impediments to destroy our pace and to slow us down. If there were to be no interruption, we could become a member on 1 January 2014. Turkey is ready for this, in terms of her economy and other conditions, and is moving towards this goal. Turkey has taken her place in all the Europe-related and Europe-based organisations. The European Union is the only exception, so we should take our place in this one too. How is it possible for Turkey, a member of NATO and OECD, and also of almost all European organisations, not to be accepted into the European Union. We will join the EU.

AB: Thank you very much. If time permits, I would also like to ask your views about the other three foreign issues which have been of some concern for Turkey. These are the relations with Armenia, Northern Iraq and Cyprus. Will there be any solution that is acceptable to Turkey as far as these issues are concerned within the next ten year period?

H.E.: Yes, let me take them in reverse order. Turkey will continue seeking a resolution to the Cyprus problem, as she has done so far. She has already demonstrated that she is ready for a solution, but just as with the tango it takes two sides to do it. No matter how good are the intentions of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, they cannot achieve a result on their own. We saw this happening when the plan of the Secretary General of the United Nations had been negotiated. Turkey as well as the Turkish Cypriots accepted this plan; so did Greece, but the other side rejected the Secretary General's impartial plan. For this reason, my answer to this question will be brief: We will contribute to the search for a solution.

Secondly, Northern Iraq. We totally respect the sovereignty, administrative system and territory of the people of Northern Iraq. In many international meetings and conferences held by the neighbouring countries in the past we have acted as their supporter and we are in constant touch with them at all administrative levels. We have done our best to contribute to the peace process and will continue doing so. The only problem we have with Iraq is the fact that some parts of its territory provide a base for international terrorism. We are against the international terror organisation, which has six or seven camps in Iraq. There is a concept developed in the West as the 'War on Terror' and within this concept we are fighting against terrorism. We hope that the Government in Iraq will in due course join our efforts and that by acting together we can eradicate terrorism.

As for your last question, the Armenian issue is a very sad one indeed. It appears that the interest in the welfare and development of the country has been totally brushed aside. The Armenians have been wasting their time by pressing various parliaments to rewrite history and to sentence Turkey, so that Turkey will be condemned. They have been chasing a mirage of rights. Turkey cannot accept these groundless claims nor can she sympathise with them. Let us consider the present facts at the moment: Despite looking for it for a long time, they have not found any evidence to show that the Turkish nation committed genocide. It is only a claim and nothing else. I really hope that Armenia starts thinking positively about ways to establish cooperation with Turkey rather than indulging in baseless allegations, because only the former can bring Armenia infinite opportunities. I am not only talking about the opening up of the air space, as a result of which there are presently four or five flights a week to and back from their country. I am not making a political point either by referring to the 55,000 Armenian nationals working and earning their living in Turkey, without a visa, and with the goodwill of the Turkish people. I am talking about much bigger opportunities. Turkey is a NATO country and if Armenia collaborates with Turkey, NATO can be extended to the doorstep of Armenia. When we become a member, the EU will also be reachable for Armenia. Turkey is the avenue, the boulevard, through which Armenia can join the rest of the world. If the Armenians are sensible, they will change their attitude at once and start benefiting from the opportunities that Turkey could offer them. On the other hand, if they decide to continue with their dogmatic and groundless claims and waste their time, Turkey should not be blamed for their misfortunes..

AB: Finally, I would like to conclude with a question which, I suppose, will not take much of your time. Are there any support mechanisms that can be made available by the Turkish government to Turkish youngsters who reside in the UK and who, because of the extraordinary academic performance they have shown, promise a very bright future?

H.E.: This is a very important matter. Such youngsters will have to be supported to further their studies. However it is not right to expect only the government to provide this support. In modern times, NGOs as well as the business world have become very influential and powerful. I am sure that there are and will be such institutions to stretch out a helping hand to young people who promise a bright future.

AB: Thank you very much indeed, Your Excellency.

AHMED ADNAN SAYGUN

1907 –1991

A Turkish composer, musicologist and writer on music, one of the most important 20th century composers in Turkish music history. A master of the neoclassical form, and his works are rooted in Western musical practice; yet they incorporate traditional Turkish folk songs and culture. The London *Times* called him "the grand old man of Turkish music, who was to his country what Jean Sibelius is to Finland, what Manuel de Falla is to Spain, and what Béla Bartók is to Hungary."

"A titan of modern Turkish music." – *The New York Times*

Centennial, 2007

Gülsin Onay talks about Ahmed Adnan Saygun



Interview with Gökçe Altay (Bilkent University),
Sevda-Cenap And Music Foundation, 21 May 2007

Gülsin Onay, you were a pupil of Adnan Saygun and you had a chance to work with him over a long period of time. What does he mean to you? How would you describe his personality, his musical character and his identity as a teacher?

As a personality, Saygun was a source of endless wisdom. He had such depth and such infinite knowledge on every subject that you realised that he was never content with learning only the surface of matters. Without one hundred per cent knowledge of

a subject, he would never say, “I know it”. For instance he would only talk about a book if he himself knew the book as well as its writer. When he said, “Unfortunately I don’t know him very well,” about an author, most probably he would have read all but a couple of that author’s books. I take this as an incredible attribute. Those who met him would be ashamed of their own ignorance. This was actually true for every subject. For instance, someone who boasted of being an excellent performer, composer or a conductor, would feel very ashamed upon meeting Saygun and there were no exceptions to this.

Yet there was another aspect to the matter. His attitude would totally change if you approached him saying, “I am sorry but I do not know this well enough”. When Saygun met a talented person who sincerely wanted to benefit from his endless wisdom, he then would work with that person for hours, holding nothing back and willing to convey all his knowledge. He would even spend days on this. I for one learned my lesson well from that modesty and experienced that attitude many times. For instance, when I went to Paris and they said, “What is there left to teach this girl?” I thought I still had a lot to learn. Our studies with Saygun were at a rather advanced level. He contributed to our development in many different ways. Work discipline was of vital importance to him.

In short, I can say that Saygun had two sides. One was compassionate, the hard-working ‘side’ of the man who wanted to convey all his knowledge and spur you on; the other ‘side’, if you did not know where you stood, would put you in your place in the most frank manner. For that reason there are many people who think of Saygun as cold and remote.

His death was a great loss for me. However I continue my deep relationship with him through his works and I hope I do justice to his memory.

In your opinion, what was the effect on his works of all the adverse conditions he had to endure?

I think perhaps he kept those separate from his music. Of course, they were bound to have some influence; but Saygun’s music is a complete universe in itself. He came to this world to create under any conditions. He was really an extraordinary composer. We see that even though every element is present in his music, there are some elements that are not found in anybody else, and that his music can be identified from the very first notes. He created very different works in his various periods. Some of them are more introvert, more elegiac; yet others are extrovert and very exuberant.

The reflections of a life lived fully...

Yes, that is very true. It must also be taken into account that after every work he created, he put all his strength and courage in creating a next new work to present to the world. His incredible effort here was not for his own glorification but to do his share for the benefit of humanity.

Did you ever work with Saygun on performing his works? Did he ever recommend you anything or tell you a wish?

In general no, but I must say that Saygun knew his own works very well. Not every composer is like that, you know – in fact, I never saw another composer who knew his own works so well. This is another very rare feature. Saygun would immediately notice the changes I made to the work while performing. Sometimes he would find them very appropriate and even pay a compliment like, “This is now your work more

than mine". He very much approved of my style. At the same time, he made some very useful comments about several of his works, for example the Etudes. I learned many good things from him, for instance about the use of the pedal and the colours you can create with it. You could even solve issues regarding the instrument with him in attaining a musical result. He was that kind of a genius.

About the First Piano Concerto: there are such criticisms as, "Even though fluent in its energy and character, due to the intensity of orchestration, the piano is too much overshadowed". What are your opinions on this?

It certainly has intense orchestral writing. However, it is up to the conductor and the soloist, who need to find the balance and thus display the technique used in the work. I spoke with Gürer Aykal a lot about the Second Piano Concerto. There is serious work to be done to reconstitute the balance. For this reason, performing it is very hard.

For some of Saygun's piano works, especially with his concertos, he is compared to Bartok. Can we hear what you think of this comparison?

Saygun himself explains it like this: When you carry out musical research in certain regions, you find out that different civilizations living in the same rough area have used a folk tune in common and taken parts of it. For this reason, such a tune can be the common medium of both Turks, Finns and Hungarians. When the source is the same, the similarity exists naturally, in the essence. Yet, how each composer processes it is of course very different.

Saygun dedicated his Second Piano Concerto to you and you premiered it. Could you tell us about the process from the composing stage to the first performance?

First of all, of course it was a very exciting event for me. That he wrote this concerto for me made me experience very special feelings. I was so happy, so honoured that it is hard to put it in words. To cooperate in such an important task was a very special situation in my musical life. Along with this, we observe that there is much more intensity in that concerto. When you examine the Variations for Orchestra, which Saygun composed in extreme old age, you again find the colour of that period. The orchestration of the Second Concerto is much more sophisticated compared to the First. It is a work of enormous depth: very introvert, very impressive. I think there is a melancholy close to death and also a spiritual expression.... We can feel that there.

Maybe in a certain way, he continued along the line of Yunus Emre...

Yes, I agree. Yet, we can rather say of the concerto that it was a "closing" phase.

Could you inform us about your recent activities regarding performing Saygun's works?

There are really important events on the calendar this year. In May I performed Saygun's First Piano Concerto with Rengim Gökmen conducting the Macedonian Symphony Orchestra in Skopje. On 6 June, again with Rengim Gökmen conducting, we will perform the First concerto in the Wiener Konzerthaus with the Vienna Symphony Orchestra. In the United States, I will play Saygun's Twelve Preludes, Sonatina and Etudes at the Gina Bachauer and Golandsky Institute International Piano Festivals as well as in my recital at the Chicago Cultural Centre. I will also play Saygun's First Piano Concerto with the London Philharmonic; Gürer Aykal will conduct the orchestra. Of course Saygun is a constant part of my Turkey programme and this is not just for the occasion of his centenary: I have played Saygun's concertos

in 21 countries. I have performed in 56 countries so far and in all my concerts I have always played Saygun's works.

How were the reactions to these concerts?

Saygun was much admired in Skopje. Both the musicians of the orchestra and the musicians in general and also the audience take great pleasure in discovering Saygun. It is quite interesting that I always get the same reaction wherever I play Saygun, from Japan to the States the musicians say, "Why did we not come across this music before?" and they feel very familiar with this music. For instance, they recognise the aksak rhythms so naturally and play them so well that it is really interesting.

Maybe they find themselves in it...

Yes. Actually that is true in every instance if the quality and the value of the music is universal. That is, any people speaking any language, from whatever culture they come, listen to this music with the same feelings and actually somewhat believing in the necessity of its presence.

Actually this music somehow reaches out to people, doesn't it?

Certainly. The necessity for the presence of this music makes itself obvious thus. Both the performers and the audience understand that this music has held a place in the repertoire for a long time but they have just discovered it.

A FAMILY MEMENTO FOR THE YEAR OF YAHYA KEMAL

by Osman Streater



2008 is the 50th anniversary of the death of the famous poet Yahya Kemal Beyatli. The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism has seized on the occasion and declared this to be the Year of Yahya Kemal.

Having been born in 1884, and living until 1958, Yahya Kemal was destined to live out his life in times of change. His particular distinction was in the way in which he positively embraced change. For example, he offered early encouragement to the creators of the new Turkish, or *Öz Türkçe* as it came to be known. His family name, dating back to the middle ages, was Şehsuvar, which in Persian means 'man with a horse'. When the law requiring Turkish citizens to register surnames came out, Yahya Kemal translated the old family name into the Turkish Beyatlı, and registered it as his family's surname for the new Turkish era.

Yahya Kemal was also unusual in speaking up for Istanbul in his poetry, and indeed in doing so more than any other poet since Nedim of the 'Tulip Age', who died in 1730. This may sound unusual today, but in fact many leading contemporaries of his, such as the equally famous Tevfik Fikret, tended to look upon Istanbul as the

embodiment of the Sick Man of Europe, for example in Tevfik Fikret's case when he wrote of:

'...the crumbling shores of the Bosphorus,
Winding their languid, aimless, isolated way'


Or addressed:

'Dear Traveller, eager to take your flight
As you spring from Byzantium's withered arms'

(both translations are my mother Nermin Menemencioğlu's)

Yahya Kemal served the new Republic in his career as a diplomat as well as in his poetry. Though never married, he was no stranger to love. Best of all, perhaps, at least to those old enough to remember it, he was a *habitué* of the wonderful old Park Hotel in Istanbul's Ayazpaşa near Taksim Square, where he spent the last nineteen years of his life. The Park, with its sophisticated waiters and skilled barman, was to a number of leading contemporaries, including my father Jasper Streater, Istanbul's answer to a London gentlemen's club. During his own lifetime Atatürk himself seemed to think so, too. He was known for dropping in from the nearby Dolmabahçe Palace, and indeed put up his guests King Edward VIII and Mrs Simpson there.

Nadir Nadi described Yahya Kemal's domination of the sociable and by no means teetotal bar scene at the Park in 1964 in the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, which he owned:



‘Yahya Kemal would read out verses from his own poetry, then recount anecdotes from Ottoman history, and then, as the mood took him, would sound off political attacks or tear personal reputations apart. If, the next day, someone who he had been fulminating against only the night before were to drop by, he would forget everything and grasp the man fondly to his breast’. (My translation)

Here is a little memory of just such an evening, left to me by my father. There is no need to flinch from the Arabic script which Yahya Kemal naturally preferred, like other Turks of his and indeed even later generations – I taught myself to read it years ago. Naturally, Yahya Kemal couldn’t quite work out how to write ‘Streater’ in that script, but he did his best in spelling the name out as ‘İstirigter’. So here, in memory of Yahya Kemal, the 50th anniversary of whose death has made 2008 The Year of Yahya Kemal in Turkey, and indeed in memory of my father Jasper, the 30th anniversary of whose death was last year, I offer you (1) Yahya Kemal’s manuscript of his poem ‘Evening Music’ with its dedication to my father, (2) a transcription of the poem into modern Turkish letters, and (3) my mother Nermin Menemencioğlu’s translation of the poem into English, from the Penguin Book of Turkish Verse.

Aziz İstiriğter'e Hatıra**Akşam Musikisi**

Kandilli'de, eski bahçelerde,
Akşam kapanınca perde perde
Bir hatıra zevki var kaderde

Artık ne gelen, ne beklenen var
Tenha yolun ortasında rüzgar
Teşrin yapraklarıyla oynar

Gittikçe derinleşir saatler,
Dikkatle, yavaş yavaş ve yer yer,
Sessizlik daima ilerler.

Ürperme verir hayale sık sık,
Her bir kapıdan karanlık,
Çok belli ayak sesinden artık.

Gözlerden uzaklaşınca dünya,
Bin bir geceden birinde güya
Başlar rüya içinde rüya.

Yahya B.

A Memento for Dear Streater**Evening Music**

At Kandilli, in the old garden, when
Evening drops down her curtains one by one
Sadness is tinged with happy memories.

No one is coming, no one is expected,
And in the middle of the lonely road
The wind is playing with October's leaves.

By slow degrees the hours deepen now,
And with inexorable tenderness
Further and further still, the silence spreads.

Now wandering phantoms cause recurrent
shivers,
And darkness, coming in at every door,
Is by her footsteps clearly manifest.

Then, as the world retreats from seeing eyes,
On this night of a thousand and one nights
A dream, as though within a dream, begins.

Yahya B.

Investigating Multilingualism in Turkish Complementary Schools

by

Angela Creese (University of Birmingham) and Vally Lytra, Taşkın Baraç & Dilek
Yağcıoğlu-Ali (all of King's College, London)

1. Introduction

This report emerges from an 18-month ESRC-funded research project, 'Investigating Multilingualism in Complementary Schools in Four Communities' (RES-000-23-1180). The study investigated multilingualism in Bangladeshi, Chinese, Turkish, and Gujarati communities in, respectively, Birmingham, Manchester, London, and Leicester. The present report refers to the Turkish case study in London and summarises key findings drawing on the case-study report for Turkish complementary schools by the above authors: 'Investigating Multilingualism in Turkish Complementary Schools in London', Birmingham University, 2007.

Education provision in Turkish in London is provided by a number of independent Turkish complementary schools. The first Turkish complementary schools date back to the 1950s and were established by Cypriot Turks. But most schools were established from the early 1980s onwards. In 2000, an umbrella organisation called “Turkish Language Education and Culture Consortium UK” was established, bringing together 18 Turkish supplementary/complementary schools in the Greater London area (see www.turkishschools.co.uk for more details). Besides an explicit focus on Turkish linguistic and cultural maintenance, schools may run classes on Turkish music and folk dancing as well as homework clubs in English, maths and science to support children in their mainstream schools.

To date, even though Turkish is the sixth most common language in London schools (15,600 pupils) according to the Community Languages Bulletin Report (2005) there is still limited research investigating Turkish-speaking young people. The present report aims to raise the profile of Turkish-speaking young people in UK educational research by focusing on the following themes: (1) the linguistic, cultural and social significance of Turkish complementary schools, (2) the young people’s languages and literacies and (3) the negotiation of identities.

2. The Turkish complementary schools

This research project consists of four interlocking case studies with two researchers working in two complementary schools in each case-community over a period of ten weeks. For the Turkish case study, we selected two schools located in different parts of London. One was in East London (**East London Turkish School**) and the other was in West London (**West London Turkish School**). Both the names of the two schools and the participants in the project have been changed to protect their anonymity. In each school, we observed a range of settings, including classrooms, break-times, assemblies and other formal school contexts (e.g. end-of-year and national celebrations). We audio-recorded three key participant children in **East London Turkish School** and one key participant child in **West London Turkish School** over six weeks. We also audio- and video-recorded teachers working with the key participant children and interviewed the young people, their parents, teachers and members of the two schools’ managing committees. We also collected data relating to each school’s policy, planning and curriculum and took photographs in a range of settings.

East London Turkish School was founded in 1987. When the field-work was undertaken, the school had about 250 children and ran on Saturday mornings. The school attracted children living mainly in North, NE and East London. The majority of the children were of Cypriot-Turkish heritage, although there were some children whose families originated from mainland Turkey and some children of mixed background. **West London Turkish School** was founded in 1988. At the time of the field-work, the school had about 110 children and ran on Sunday mornings. The school attracted children mainly from West and NW London. Many of the children were of mainland Turkish heritage and nearly half of them were of mixed background.

3. Linguistic, Cultural and Social Significance of Turkish Complementary Schools

Both schools considered Turkish linguistic and cultural maintenance as one of their central aims which they regarded as ‘supplementing’ the young people’s mainstream education. Learning about Turkish language and culture was seen as helping children do better in mainstream school and paving the way for higher education. The supplementary role of the Turkish complementary schools was evident from the other activities they organised (e.g. homework clubs to support English, maths and science in their mainstream school, folk dance, music and football clubs). These activities could potentially provide opportunities for children to use their Turkish beyond the Turkish language classroom. The young people’s Turkish linguistic and cultural maintenance was seen as part of combining the children’s Turkish culture with their English culture. This additional aim of Turkish complementary schools implies an inclusive approach to society which resonates with the goals of mainstream schools too.

Both schools were vibrant educational spaces that countered mainstream narratives of academic failure. Combating Turkish-speaking young people’s educational underachievement was particularly high on the agenda of both schools. This was reflected, for instance, in the meetings between the schools’ administrators and parents. During these meetings, school administrators and parents discussed ways to raise the children’s achievement levels both in mainstream and complementary schools and improve parental involvement in the children’s education. These meetings revealed the important role Turkish complementary schools play in helping parents learn more about the British educational system and British society more generally. This was particularly true for parents with limited exposure to the UK educational system and poor command of English.

Moreover, both schools celebrated high achieving children and their academic and other success during assemblies and other social occasions that took place in complementary schools or other venues (e.g. end-of-year and prize awarding ceremonies). The children’s efforts were always publicly praised and high achievers were implicitly positioned as role-models.

We also observed a similar view of academic success in the interviews with the young people themselves. The children came across as high achievers who were performing well both in mainstream and Turkish complementary schools and were involved in a range of extra-curricular activities after school. Their academic achievements were also linked to pride in and confidence in their bilingualism/multilingualism. The children remarked how proud they were to be able to speak Turkish. Baran, one of the children we worked closely with said the following during our interview (in English):

Interviewer: How do you feel about being able to speak Turkish?

Baran: I kind of show off to my friends.

Interviewer: You do, how do you show off?

Baran: I say, “I know two main languages and I’m learning two more.”

Interviewer: Oh I see, you’re adding your German and French as well. So you say, “I am multilingual, I know four languages.” How many languages do they speak?

Baran: My friends? They speak one main language...

Interviewer: Hhhmmm

Baran: ... which is English

Interviewer: Hhh but you have two main languages?

- Baran: Yeah Turkish and English.
Interviewer: And you're proud about it?
Baran: Yeah

[Interview with key participant child]

4. Range of Linguistic Practices in Turkish Complementary Schools

Children made use of whatever languages and language varieties they had at their disposal to communicate with their peers, teachers, parents and other adults. Although teachers focused on the teaching and learning of standard Turkish, children spoke Turkish influenced by their families' regional background and history of migration to the UK. For instance, the most commonly used regional Turkish variety was Cypriot-Turkish, especially in "East London Turkish School", which reflected the composition of the school population. Moreover, children seemed to show an awareness of the different varieties of Turkish and an ability to talk about their variation in language use, which they linked to different contexts (e.g. home versus Turkish complementary school) and participants (e.g. talking to peers versus talking to adults).

Like the children, some of the teachers spoke Turkish with a regional accent, depending on their personal trajectories. Moreover, many of the teachers were multilingual themselves, speaking one or more minority languages (e.g. Kurdish, Zaza) or other Turkic languages (e.g. Azeri). As a result, Turkish complementary schools seemed to provide a linguistic space where the co-existence of standard Turkish and other regional varieties and dialects was widely accepted as the norm. This co-existence reflected the richness of the children's, teachers' and parents' linguistic repertoires. Nevertheless, while acknowledging this linguistic variability, teachers focused on the teaching and learning of standard Turkish during lessons.

Children showed a strong preference for English both inside and outside the classroom. Teachers, parents and school administrators commented on the children's overwhelming preference for using English by acknowledging that in many cases children were dominant in English and more comfortable using English than Turkish. Overall, we observed the following pattern: children tended to use mainly English with occasionally some Turkish in their informal talk among peers during the break and during the lesson and Turkish with occasionally some English in their classroom talk with teachers. The extent to which children used English across contexts and participants was not uniform. It did, however, demonstrate their intimate knowledge of English (including idiomatic English) and its youth varieties (e.g. slang).

Teachers often responded to the children's use of English during the lesson with the phrase "Türkçe konuş" <speaking Turkish> which promoted a clear separation of the two languages in the Turkish language classroom. At the same time, teachers allowed for some space for English in their classrooms. Although the use of English was not deemed necessary for content teaching, they acknowledged its usefulness for pragmatic reasons (e.g. to discipline the children, to give instructions, to respond to clarifications) and occasionally interpersonal reasons (e.g. for humour). This selected use of English both for pragmatic and interpersonal reasons seemed to suggest that the Turkish language classroom allowed for some bilingual (Turkish-English) instruction. Even though teachers repeatedly emphasized that the focus of their lessons was the

teaching and learning of Turkish, it appeared that English played an important role in this process. Its importance is not surprising if we take into consideration that most children were dominant in English and that their competence in English tended to be higher than that of some of their teachers, potentially positioning the latter at a disadvantage.

Literacy in standard Turkish emerged as one of the main aims of Turkish complementary schools. Children also mentioned the importance of literacy in Turkish for them and the role of Turkish complementary schools in this process. Building on the development of their literacy skills in Turkish complementary schools, children further enhanced their bilingual (Turkish-English) literacy skills outside the classroom setting through the use of digital technology and cultural products. Besides bilingual literacy skills in Turkish and English, many young people reported learning one or two other instructed foreign languages in their mainstream schools and some children reported learning to read the Qur'an at the mosque in the afternoons.

5. Negotiation of Young People's Multilingual and Multicultural Identities

Children showed extensive knowledge about languages and literacies as well as the ability to talk about this knowledge (especially their knowledge of English) and draw upon it in creative and playful ways inside and outside the Turkish language classroom. In so doing, they negotiated a multilingual and multicultural identity for themselves – one that allowed them to move seamlessly between languages and cultures.

Indeed, in their personal narratives, children often made an explicit link between language, identity and family heritage. They associated who they were with the fact that they spoke Turkish and their parents were originally from Turkey or Cyprus. At the same time, they alternated among a range of readily available ethnic labels to identify themselves (i.e. “Turkish”, “British”, “English”, “Cypriot-Turkish”, “half English”, “half Turkish-Cypriot”). We observed that the children's reported ethnic affiliations were complex, dynamic and multi-layered.

Moreover, we observed that the children's multilingual and multicultural identities were closely linked with their identities as learners and as young people. During lessons, children performed their learner identities in different and complex ways. They performed positive learner identities by asking clarification questions, volunteering to do substitution drills, competing to do reading comprehension exercises on the whiteboard, taking turns to read aloud the assigned texts. At the same time, some children also performed negative aspects of their learner identities. For instance, they chatted with their peers, moved around the classroom without asking for permission or fidgeted with their mobile phones and footballs.

Children negotiated a range of identities with peers both inside and outside the Turkish language classroom. For instance, during lessons children often took on the role of the “teacher” and corrected their peers' Turkish. During the break-time, children seemed to foreground more aspects of their “youth identities”. Children exchanged bits of information about absent third parties, shared plans for the week-

end, made passing references to particular boys and girls and engaged in the communal consumption of food and drinks. In addition, some children reported taking part in competitive sports as well as watching sports on TV, especially the World Cup that was on at the time of the field-work. As a result, for these children participating in and consuming sports seemed to emerge as an important aspect of their youth identities. Other children's talk was saturated by references to their media practices associated with digital technology and techno-popular culture (e.g. viewing of particular movies, listening to specific types of music, discussing the mechanics of exchanging music files via mobile phones, participating in on-line gaming communities).

6. Conclusion

One central aim of Turkish complementary schools was to support and enhance Turkish linguistic and cultural maintenance among mainly British-born and -raised Turkish-speaking young people. This aim was combined with a discourse of inclusion in present-day multicultural British society. Moreover, Turkish complementary schools were vibrant educational spaces that countered mainstream narratives of academic failure for Turkish-speaking youth, through complementing their learning opportunities and celebrating high achievement. In general, children engaged positively with their Turkish lessons drawing on their rich linguistic and cultural capital for learning and play. They were proud of their multilingualism and showed extensive knowledge about languages and literacies as well as the ability to talk about this knowledge in new and creative ways. For most children English was their dominant language and code-switching between languages (English-Turkish) and language varieties (e.g. regional varieties of Turkish, Cypriot-Turkish) seemed to be the "natural" choice. Through their multilingual practices and positive attitudes towards their multilingualism, children negotiated a range of different identities, including aspects of their multilingual and multicultural identities, their learner identities and youth identities. These practices and attitudes, however, were at odds with prevailing discourses in British society at large which regards bilingualism/multilingualism as a problem and often has a tokenistic approach to multiculturalism. The children's practices and attitudes in Turkish complementary schools provided an alternative voice to dominant societal discourses.

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For further information about the research project please go to:
<http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/minisite/multilingualism/>.

To obtain a copy of the case study report contact Dr Vally Lytra, Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, King's College London, London WC2R 2LS <vally.lytra@pobox.com>



The 'MEDELHAVSMUSEET' AND THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL TREASURES OF CYPRUS

Arin Bayraktaroğlu

Archaeology, no doubt, offers the potential for studying long-term cultural processes and the opportunity to learn the lessons of countless cultures. Recovering this knowledge may prove vital to our own survival. I have once again realised how true this is after my recent trip to Sweden.

I discovered the *Medelhavsmuseet* (the Mediterranean Museum), which is situated on Fredsgatan, in Stockholm city centre, only by chance, and in order to quench my sudden thirst for knowledge I took a quick look inside. I had not known until then that it housed Sweden's most important archaeological collections of ancient and historical relics from the Mediterranean countries. The building itself apparently dates back to 1905, and was initially used as a bank, but was later turned into a museum. Its neo-classical interior is unique in Scandinavian architectural history and is worth seeing for its own sake. The Oriental Café on the second floor, with its classical setting and oriental rugs, offers an accommodating ambiance, magnificent views of the city centre and excellent light meals.

The Near Eastern and Islamic collections in the museum come mainly from Iran and Turkey and are used to show the development of Islamic art from the 7th century onwards as 'the heir to the cultures of antiquity and Christianity'. In addition to the permanent collections that the museum owns, frequent activities are organised to exhibit guest artefacts. The Museum's Deputy Director, Ms Suzanne Unge Sörling, told me that there would be an exhibition in March 2008, featuring the old wooden houses from the Black Sea coast, and also that the blue and white china collection from Topkapı Palace would be on show there this summer.

The *Medelhavsmuseet* uses the internet to reach a wide circle of enthusiasts for Islamic art. Their virtual collection features a gallery of the Ottomans, which is interesting and can be visited at www.discoverislamincart.org/exhibitions/ISL/theottomans/?Ing=en. However, the museum takes pride, more than anything else, in its Cyprus collection, which is the largest and most important collection of Cypriot excavation finds outside the island, recovered by the Swedish Expedition from 1927 to 1931. It was carried out by four Swedes, led by an archaeologist, Einar Gjerstad, and the story behind it is reminiscent of a Hollywood movie. In his book *Ages and Days in Cyprus*, Gjerstad recounts why he chose to study Cyprus in preference to other locations²¹.

In 1922 Professor Axel W. Persson of Uppsala was travelling to Greece. In a railway station in Serbia he started a conversation with someone called Luke Zenon Pierides who said his father had been the Swedish Consul in Cyprus, where he had settled down. Having found common ground, the two got engaged in a lively conversation. After some time Pierides suddenly said that he had run into some trouble and the Serbian customs officials had taken all his money. He then asked the professor to

²¹ Gjerstad, E., *Ages and Days*. SIMA Pocket book 12. Göteborg 1980.

lend him some money, which he promised to send to Athens once he got back to Cyprus. Professor Persson gave Prierides what he needed, although he had no hope that he would recover the loan. Following this, Prierides told the professor that he had many antique artefacts in his house, and that his home town, Larnaca, was full of such treasures hidden underground and that the professor should send a group of his students to carry out an excavation. When Persson arrived in Athens, to his surprise, he indeed found the loan money waiting for him. He did not forget Prierides, and one day when he was talking to one of his students, Einar Gjerstad, he told him to go to Cyprus with a view to checking the archaeological sites. This is how Gjerstad made his way to Cyprus. He was greeted there by Prierides, who looked after him most amicably. The island fascinated Gjerstad, and upon his return to Sweden he made arrangements to go back there again, this time with a team consisting of Alfred Westholm (better known as 'Alfiros', a name which was given to him by the Cypriots), Erik Sjoqvist and the architect John Lindros. Gjerstad also managed to borrow one of the first automobiles from the director of the Volvo Company, and this is how the team travelled long distances in Cyprus. At the end of the four year expedition, however, the car was returned to Volvo and is apparently exhibited now in the Volvo Museum in Göteborg.

The four young men investigated 25 sites on the island within a span of four years, and discovered, among many others, on a rock-island, Petra tou Limniti, remnants from the pre-ceramic Stone Age; in Lapithos tombs from the Cypriot Bronze Age; and at Marion finds from the Iron Age. Also, at a point overlooking Petra tou Limniti, the Palace of Vouni, an impressive building, was discovered. The expedition years are detailed in four volumes which were published between 1934 and 1972²². About 10,000 objects were unearthed during this expedition, including hundreds of terracotta figurines of different sizes which were found at a sacred cult site, Ajia Irini. The finds were first brought to a studio in Nicosia, where they were cleaned, restored and divided between Cyprus and Sweden, although it is reported that 65% of the total findings went to Sweden. These are now partly in storage and partly on display at *Hedelhavsmuseet*. The ones which remained in Cyprus are presently housed in the Cyprus Museum in Nicosia.

In the Museum's Oriental Café interesting posters and photographs are displayed on the walls. Among these stands out a large photograph of the four young Swedish archaeologists who carried out the most important excavation on Cyprus.

Another eye-catching item is a poster which reads

“Research on ancient Cyprus and its role in the Eastern Mediterranean is faced with great difficulties today, due to religious and political conflicts. At the same time, research into eastern European cultural heritage is increasing among the member countries. This imbalance in the research of Mediterranean cultural history may lead to an all too one-sided and simplified perspective on Europe's cultural history where Europe's long term relations to the Middle East and the rest of the world will not be sufficiently recognised.”

²² Gjerstad, E. et al., *The Swedish Cyprus Expedition. Finds and Results of the Excavations in Cyprus 1927-31*. Bd I-IV: 3. Stockholm, Lund 1934-1972.

It is easy to hear the concern voiced in these words – the concern which is created by the slowing down of the work in the Eastern Mediterranean because of the political situation on the island.



The four men of the Swedish Cyprus Expedition at Mersinaki, from left to right: John, Alfros, Erik, the Author.

(The picture in the Oriental Café - *Hedelhavsmuseet*)

An excellent survey of the Swedish excavations, written by Marie-Louise Winbladh and published on the website of the Embassy of Cyprus in Sweden, unfortunately features a similarly negative note and even an ungrounded accusation in its final paragraph:

“All sites, except three, excavated by the Swedes are situated in the northern part of Cyprus, which for 29 years now has illegally been occupied by Turkey. Many photographs are therefore important documents of the beautiful and remote parts of the island, now inaccessible to the Greek-Cypriots, their friends and most scholars. Many of the sites are destroyed or transformed into military areas.”

I asked Mr Fuat Azimli, Director of the Northern Cyprus Historical Sites and Museums *Department (Kuzey Kıbrıs Eski Eserler ve Müzeler Dairesi)*, for his comments about these views. In his response he drew a different picture:

“The sites of the Swedish Expedition had either been left to their fate or excavated by other archaeological teams until the Turkish intervention in 1974. Until then, they had not been registered as ‘sites of archaeological importance (SAI)’. My Department has carried out work to register a considerable number of them as SAIs. Their present status is as follows:

- Ajia Irini: Open to public. This year it will be registered as SAI.
- Ajios Iakavos: Open to public. Already registered as SAI.
- Enkomi: Open to public. Already registered as SAI.
- Kountoura: Open to public. We are presently working towards registering it as SAI.
- Kythrea: Open to public.
- Lapithos: Open to public. Already registered as SAI.
- Mersinaki: Open to public.


- Millia: Open to public.
- Neta: Open to public.
- Nitovikla: Open to public.
- Oura: Open to public.
- Karpas Peninsula: Turned into a National Park and registered as SAI.

Anyone interested in these sites, Turks, Greeks or international enthusiasts can visit them without any restrictions.

Northern Cyprus has been living through an economic embargo for the last 30 years, and we have no resources to carry out excavations which require large amounts of financial input. There have been no applications received from international archaeological teams for the upkeep of these sites either. As a result, we are doing our best for their protection, using what is presently available to us. Some of these areas in the 80 year period of inactivity, have been covered by a new layer of soil but this does not mean they are destroyed. Indeed, they are now under natural protection, awaiting new excavations.

It is not true that the archaeological sites have been transformed into military areas. To mark the 80th anniversary of the Swedish Expedition, about 2 years ago, the Director of Medelhavsmuseet and the Cyprus Ambassador to Sweden came to northern Cyprus and were given a tour of the sites by the technical personnel of our Department. They would not have been able to visit the sites had these been turned into military zones. Nor would our technical personnel have been invited to the lecture given after this visit in southern Cyprus by the Director of Medelhausmuseet. ”

It is a shame that while the archaeological treasures, some already unearthed but needing preservation and some still waiting to be excavated, prove that this beautiful Mediterranean island has accommodated many civilisations in the history of mankind and over many thousands of years, its present inhabitants cannot draw conclusions from what lies under their feet, and find ways to live side by side in a more harmonious and accommodating way.



A Report by Osman Streater (2007)

on

'THE MESSIAH OF TURKEY'by **Aubrey Ross**, 2007, (291), ISBN-10: 095524045X**Background**

Many people in Turkey are brought up knowing a little about the story of Sabbatai Zevi. The sexual parts of the story tend to find particular favour – particularly the wife-swapping, which apparently still goes on amongst his followers today. Who these followers are has traditionally been shrouded in mystery in Turkey – people with Turkish names, who behave as Turks and as Muslims, but lead secret lives. When one mentions Zevi's name to Jewish friends in London, there is usually a reaction, but a conversation seldom follows. Any discussion that does follow concentrates, as does Ross's book, on theology – Sabbateanism has direct links to the Kabbalah, which with Madonna's name attached to it is of course of current newsworthiness.

The basic story of Sabbatai Zevi, the “Messiah” in question

Sabbatai Zevi was a Jewish rabbi in Smyrna, the modern Izmir. He was born in 1629. In 1648 he first declared himself to be the Messiah. By the early 1660s, he had a following in Jewish communities not only in the Ottoman Empire, but in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Netherlands, England, Egypt, Morocco and the Yemen. The Ottoman Sultan, in whose lands Sabbatai Zevi was operating, did not at first mind: in the Ottoman system the Jews, like the Christians, enjoyed broad religious toleration, and the Ottomans regarded Sabbatai Zevi's repeated declarations that he was to be the ruler in the world to come as a private Jewish matter. By 1665, many Ottoman Jews, feeling that Sabbatai Zevi would very soon be ordering them to follow him to Jerusalem, had sold their homes and businesses for very little money and had their bags packed. Self-flagellation, regarded as the spiritual part of their preparation for the journey, was widely practised, so much so that a shortage of thorns was reported in Salonika, the main Sabbatean centre (and indeed the main Jewish centre in the Ottoman Empire since the expulsion of the Sephardic Jews from Spain in 1492 and their resettlement within Ottoman lands at the Sultan's invitation). Amidst all this activity, the Ottoman authorities noticed that Sabbatai Zevi's interest was switching from the afterlife to the present world, of which he was increasingly loudly claiming to be the legitimate ruler. Sabbatai Zevi was accordingly summoned to explain himself. He left, informing his followers that he was just going away “in order to take the Sultan's crown” and would not be long.

After an interlude when he was supposed to be imprisoned but managed to hold court in a castle on the Gallipoli peninsula, apparently dominating all comers by the power of his personality, Sabbatai Zevi appeared before the Sultan's Court in Edirne on 16 July 1666. The Sultan, Mehmet IV, had clearly had enough. He proposed a simple test to Sabbatai Zevi. It was that he should face a volley of arrows: if his interest really lay only in matters spiritual, as he was claiming, then surely the arrows would simply bounce off. Sabbatai Zevi declined this invitation. Whereupon the Sultan briskly offered him a choice: Sabbatai Zevi could either convert to Islam, or be executed. The Sultan said he didn't much care which, but he did demand an immediate decision. Sabbatai Zevi then chose conversion to Islam.

His followers follow Sabbatai Zevi and ‘convert’ to Islam.

Not surprisingly, Sabbatai Zevi’s followers were stunned by his conversion to Islam. Much to their dismay, many felt they had to follow him in converting. They were given the name ‘*Dönme*’ by the Turks, which means ‘The Turned’, or more pejoratively, ‘Turncoats’. (You may think that rude, but in Spain they called Jewish converts to Christianity ‘*Marranos*’, which means ‘pigs’. And indeed, some Turks also find it rude and prefer the more polite euphemism ‘*Avdeti*’, which means ‘Returner’, as in returning to the fold.)

It soon became clear that Sabbatai Zevi’s conversion to Islam was less than 100%. He soon perfected the *modus operandi* of outward Islamicism which became the hallmark of his cult. This was given the Turkish explanatory title of ‘*Benzet ama Benzeme*’ – which might be translated as ‘Look like them, but don’t be like them’. The Ottoman authorities, of course, were not blind. They soon noticed what was going on. In 1672 Sabbatai Zevi was exiled to Albania. He continued to attract a following in his exile. He died in 1676.

Following Sabbatai Zevi’s death, his *Dönme* followers made Salonika their main city. Many of them moved there. They lived as Muslims, but only married into each other’s families. Thus they have continued to the present day. And thus they might have continued unnoticed, but for events.

And now, the Kabbalah.

The shame, for want of a better word, of Sabbatai Zevi and his followers’ conversion to Islam led to the search for self-justification. Conversion out of simple cowardice or fear of death didn’t sound too good or too Messianic. It didn’t take long to come up with the idea that, far from being cowardly, conversion was in fact a brave ‘exploration of sin’. In no time at all, we find ourselves reading about not just the exploration of sin, but ‘The Sacredness of Sin’ – which links to Kabbalah.

This is how the author of the current book puts it early on: “Born out of Kabbalah, Sabbateanism broadened that Kabbalah to give it a new and compelling, if distorted, role in the life of the Jew. Although there is widespread interest in the Kabbalah today, as expressed by such Hollywood stars as Madonna, few actually know what the word means and an even smaller number understand its theories. The Hebrew word Kabbalah means reception. But it has always been associated with Jewish mysticism for two reasons. The first is because it implies direct contact with God, rather than speculation about His character, which belongs to the realm of theology...Secondly, Kabbalah is conveyed from person to person through the generations”.²³

This is a subject to which Ross returns at great length, not always comprehensibly to gentiles, as in his discussion of the four distinct parts of the Kabbalah, and particularly of the part called ‘Nitsotsim Min ha-Kelipot’. However, here he is at his best and most comprehensible:

“Kabbalah is exclusively associated with Jewish mystical thought. The Talmud provides the legal framework by which Jews live as Jews. The Kabbalah provides a

²³ ‘The Messiah of Turkey’, pp 19-20

guide to obtaining inward and immediate direct spiritual experience. In describing this experience, Jewish mystics used the analogy of the love of one human being for another, contrasting its directness and immediacy with the intellectual appraisal of a person's qualities where no passion is present".²⁴

The trouble was, the Sabbateans carried on when they should have stopped. Soon, Sabbateans seeking self-justification were developing the notion of the Sacredness of Sin in ever more creative ways. Sin can be sacred, apparently, in the same way that animal droppings can be put to positive use as fertiliser. And so we arrive at the sacredness of wife-swapping.

Not only sacred, but a Messiah will result – how's that for a justification for wife-swapping?

I don't get the impression that Aubrey Ross enjoys writing about the sexual antics of the Sabbateans – not nearly as much pleasure, at any rate, as he gets writing about the theological side of things. Apart from constituting a missed opportunity – this is definitely **not** the no-holds-barred book about the sexual antics of the followers of Sabbatai Zevi for which there is surely a market – it means that the North London author does not really like to describe what the Sabbateans got up to in those early naughty moments. Sin, we read, was to them a way of infiltrating the dark side, the 'Sitrah Achrah'...yes, yes, but what sin?...seriously, he tells us, sin was part of the exploration of new techniques to influence the heavenly process...Oh yeah – what kind of exploration of new techniques exactly?...no but seriously, he goes on, Sabbateans believed that women should take equal part with men in religious ritual...and Sabbateans practised ritual sex only to create cosmic unity...so Sabbateans were early liberators of women (i.e. the author is always looking for a positive gloss to put on anything and everything).

The wife-swapping was called 'Snuffing out the Candles' – my translation of what Ross reports as '*Mum Sönme Olayı*', more literally translated as 'the event of the blowing out of the candles'. It worked as follows. When the new season's lamb was in, Sabbatean couples would gather under one roof of an evening. Then they would blow out the candles. And then, when it was completely dark, a wife-swapping orgy would take place. Only after that could they tuck into the lamb. And when they did so, they could be sure of a job really well done – because part of the doctrine of the Sacredness of Sin was that 'one of the boys born as a fruit of that night would be the Messiah'.²⁵ So instead of the Virgin Birth, we have the Wife-Swapping Birth.

And so, you may ask, where is the Messiah? The answer, Ross informs us, is everywhere – and nowhere. "In Jewish theology a potential Messiah is born in every generation in the hope that, together with mankind, he will bring redemption to the world. Nevertheless, if he fails to inspire his followers to the degree that their combined energies change the cosmic climate, that is the end of the matter as far as that generation is concerned."²⁶

1924 – the one and only time when the Sabbateans have come out.

²⁴ 'The Messiah of Turkey', p 108

²⁵ 'The Messiah of Turkey', pp 102-3

²⁶ 'The Messiah of Turkey', p. 250

After the First World War, when Turkey had sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary and suffered defeat, Greece invaded Asia Minor in 1919. This was when Mustafa Kemal came into his own, organising Turkish resistance and expelling the Greeks in 1922. In 1923, at the Treaty of Lausanne, it was agreed that the only way to lasting peace was for minority populations to be exchanged between Greece and Turkey. This presented the Sabbateans of Salonika, for all outward purposes Turks just like the other, genuinely Turkish population of Salonika, with what they felt was a terrible dilemma. They liked Salonika. Indeed, they controlled Salonika. Yet here was the Greek government telling them to line up to be sent to Turkey, along with all the genuine Turks of the city, from whom they had hitherto prided themselves on being outwardly indistinguishable. They didn't want to go. And so, for the one and only time in history, an entire Sabbatean community confessed to actually being Jews (the regular Jews of Salonika were allowed to stay in 1924, to face the Nazis during the Second World War – but that is yet another story). However, it didn't do the Sabbateans any good. The wife-swapping, the 'Snuffing out the Candles', was used in evidence against them by the Greeks, who clearly wanted to control Salonika for themselves. The Greeks quoted Jewish law against the Sabbateans. How, asked the Greeks – and one can imagine them enjoying this – can wife-swappers be Jews? And what about the illegitimate children that resulted? Weren't they all, in fact, by their own confession, illegitimate? To quote Ross, Salonika in 1924 saw the Sabbateans "denied return to Judaism, because it was clear that many would be Mamzerim, illegitimate in Jewish law as the offspring of a married woman by a man other than her husband. In Jewish law a Mamzer cannot be admitted to the House of Israel and can only marry another Mamzer".²⁷

The author's attempts to bring the Sabbateans back to Judaism.

The end part of the book describes how Aubrey Ross meets some Sabbateans in Istanbul. He pays one of them to travel with him to Jerusalem to discuss with the religious authorities the question of their being accepted back into the fold as regular Jews. This is not a part of the book which non-Jews can be expected to follow – indeed, there is a section of several pages, printed in bold, with God spelled out as 'G-d', where the author, whom the jacket informs us was 'Minister at Richmond Hebrew Congregation', apparently describes his own solution in Jewish religious language. In any case, however, Ross's quest in Jerusalem is not to be. The Jewish authorities there prove to be every bit as resistant to accepting the Sabbateans as the Greeks in Salonika were in 1924. By all accounts distrustful of the dissimulation which by their own confession is second nature to Sabbateans, the Jerusalem authorities take cover under the Jewish law of 'Mamzerut' or illegitimacy. Indeed, they go further than the Greeks. For apparently in Jewish religious law, even in the year 2007, not only can a Mamzer or illegitimate child only marry another illegitimate child, but this holds true for ten whole generations. Only after ten generations of Jewish illegitimate children marrying each other can the eleventh generation to be born finally be legitimate. That did for Ross's attempt to reconcile the Sabbateans with Judaism, an attempt which he clearly considers of some considerable historical importance. Others may think that the notion that illegitimate kids can only legally marry other illegitimate kids, and that, even then, their kids, and their kids' kids, and their kids' kids' kids, will all continue to be looked down on as bastards, all the way through ten whole generations, is pushing it a bit in terms of civilisation.

²⁷ 'The Messiah of Turkey', pp 102-3

A bit more about the book.

I am sure Mr Ross is a leading citizen of North London society, but the book is less than totally impressive. One friend from the London press took one look at it and said that it had the appearance of the kind of book which the author had himself paid to have printed. However that may be, the author does himself no favours by displaying his academic qualifications ('BA, MSc, DipEd') at every opportunity. Real historians don't do that kind of thing.

Real historians also know much more about the background to the particular events they are writing about. The middle part of the 17th Century was a disturbed period for much of Europe. The Jews may have had their own particular problems, which led them to welcome the news that their first Messiah had arrived, but Christian Europeans also had theirs, what with Cromwell in England and the Thirty Years War on the Continent and much else. Many disturbed Christians were passing the word that the Second Coming of Christ would occur in 1666. Knowing this helps explain the particular phenomenon of Sabbatai Zevi.

On his own confession Mr Ross had not visited Turkey before he became interested in the Sabbateans. His ignorance of Turkey, of Turks, and of Turkish history is not only damaging to his book, but also profoundly patronising and even insulting to Turks. One moment he is being surprised that so many Turks speak English. The next, he is attributing the whole Kemalist revolution to the Sabbateans, as when he writes of their forced move out of Salonika in 1924: "It is surely no accident that, following their migration to Turkey, that country became a modern Islamic state..."

Finally, a word not from Mr Ross but from me about the Sabbatean situation in Turkey today.

Some modern Turks, Islamicist or otherwise, have found the Sabbatean story a useful weapon. They find the notion that there are people living amongst them who have Turkish names, who speak and behave outwardly like Turks, but who have a hidden agenda, a very useful weapon. And so, today, there are Internet sites on which page after page of Turks are denounced as secret Sabbateans. For example Orhan Pamuk, much envied in Turkey by less successful writers, is so named. So are many, many other successful writers and artists. And so are successful people in many other walks of life, from business to the military.

Looking at these Internet sites in the course of writing this report, I found names from my own family. My great-great-grandfather Namık Kemal (1840-1888), the great patriot poet of Turkey, founder of what became the Young Turks, is so named. So are the next three generations, including my mother. However, the presumably not too well educated anonymous Internet accuser has trouble with my mother's married surname and misspells Streater as 'Strader' – and then goes wrong again to name someone else as her daughter and a Sabbatean, whereas in fact I am her only child. I mention this, not because I am disappointed in not being denounced by some envy-ridden unsuccessful Turk, but just to point out that the very usefulness of the notion of Sabbateanism has led to a huge exaggeration of their number. The same person might ask me to prove that my family are not Sabbateans. That is easy, for we can trace our ancestry back to the 13th century, well before the events of Sabbatai Zevi. Indeed, we are descended in part from the Ottoman dynasty itself. I mention this just to show that

notions of the Sabbateans are very much alive in Turkey today, and not always in a healthy sense.

I prefer the way it was in my youth in Ankara, when we first got to hear stories about the mysterious Sabbateans and their wife-swapping. If we saw a really ugly woman, the joke was to say that she would do if she were Sabbatean – because, after all, once all the candles had been snuffed out, it didn't make any difference what any participant in a Sabbatean orgy looked like!



Mysteries, Whirling Dervishes and Ancient Treasures
 Unfold at the
44th Antalya Film Festival
3rd International Eurasia Film Festival
and 2nd International Eurasia Film Market
 reported and commented by Kerem Bayraktaroğlu

In the mystical and ancient Mediterranean coastal city of Antalya, sometimes referred to as the Turkish Riviera, international buyers and sellers from all over the world recently attended the Eurasia International Film Market (22-25 October), which is in its third year now and coexists with the Antalya Film Festival and 3rd Eurasia International Festival, respectively (19-28 October). Although one may instantly presume that Turkey has only one international film festival to offer, namely the Istanbul Festival, it is in fact Antalya that garners the most prestige and respect, as being the country's oldest and more lavishly funded (by TürkSat).

This year Antalya, the fruitful soil of the ancient mythology, is embracing the cinema, the mythology of modern times, for the 44th time. The **Antalya Golden Orange Film Festival** is the first national film festival organized in Turkey, and this prestigious national event has supported the Turkish film industry through its film competition and annual Golden Orange Award Ceremony. As one of the longest running festivals in Europe dedicated to celebrating the cinema, it has become a multi-dimensional event of international identity, accommodating the **International Eurasia Film Festival and Eurasia Film Market** since 2005. Introduced for the first time within the framework of the 42nd Antalya Golden Orange Film Festival, the **International Eurasia Film Festival** achieved a great success and gained its individual character as an acclaimed film festival. More than 200 films of every genre, length and format from different countries all over the world are screened as a part of the whole event. The festival is divided into different sections, each with its own unique, conceptual

profile, where the Competition section accepts films from Europe and Asia. With tributes to, and retrospectives of, world-celebrated actors/actresses and directors and the fresh names of the international film scene, the International Eurasia Film Festival is a great summit of cultural interaction and a showcase for what is happening in cinema today.

Since this is the first time that IndieWire has been invited to cover the event it seems only apt to acknowledge that the three concurring events have now become key dates in the world film festival calendar. What Antalya offers that Istanbul is unable to yet do is to create a stage for international buyers and sellers to meet and mainly sell off remaining ancillary and TV rights. Eurasia Film Festival programmer, Esra Even, commented that one 'shouldn't think of the international festival as a separate event. We wanted to do something to promote the national film industry and also promote the municipality of Antalya, which is one of the festival's biggest sponsors. The Eurasia festival and market is a platform where Turkish and foreign guests can meet each other'. Menderes Türel (Honorary President of the festival) went on to state that their 'film market aims to carry the vital and impressive advancements of the world cinema to the Turkish film industry'.

Unfortunately not many major deals occurred at the market in this quiet year and there weren't as many national and international industry professionals as expected from the past 1,000 visitors. Adding to this matter, several prominent celebrity guests decided to cancel at the last minute. However, representatives from over 70 countries did manage to make an appearance this year and joined the market, while various panel discussions (dealing with the importance of 'Crossing Borders' in co-productions) and master classes/script writing workshops were held with great success. Furthermore this year's creation of the 'Eurasia Film Festival Script Development Fund' was set up and aimed at opening a new window to film producers and enabling the Turkish screen to take part in international co-productions. With an award of approximately \$20,000 the fund lends support to film producers and encourages the Turkish cinema to promote co-produced projects. This year's recipient of the award went to *50 Reasons all in her Eyes* by Cem Akaş.

Various valid and understandable reasons have been given for a slightly dampened market and festival. The most notable was the recent terrorist incidents that occurred in Turkey before the market had a chance to get under way, and also the fact that the events had been postponed a month, in order not to coincide with the Islamic month of Ramadan. To add to this change in the festival and markets calendar, organizers were left having to compete with and be sandwiched between Pusan, MIPCOM, Rome, the London Film Festival and AFM. Yet even with all these slight mishaps most guests, professionals and cinephiles alike, weren't deterred from setting out and enjoying a week's long celebration of the Seventh Art.

Tony Watts, Director of the Eurasia Film Market, was nevertheless enthusiastic about the general outcome: 'Given the intense pressure on the buyers and sellers who have to plan where they go in a crowded autumn of festivals and markets, we were pleased with the calibre of attendance at the market with the likes of Studio Canal and Fortissimo Films. We also had a strong contingent from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Applause is due to Hong Kong for doing deals for this year's biggest film from China, *The Warlords*, starring Jet Li and Any Lau.'

This autumn the coveted Golden Orange award of the **Antalya Film Festival** went to Semih Kaplanoğlu's *Egg* (which was recently screened at the Cannes Film Festival)

and for best direction to Fatih Akın's *Edge of Heaven*. The jury was presided over by Genco Erkal (Turkey), Cem Yılmaz (Turkey), Emrah Yücel (Turkey), Hale Soygazi (Turkey), Mahinur Ergün (Turkey), Nida Karabol Akdeniz (Turkey), Uğur İçbak (Turkey) and Zeki Demirkubuz (Turkey). The national short film jury, presided over by Semir Aslanyürek (Turkey), and consisting of Balçiçek Pamir (Turkey), Cansel Elçin (Turkey), Danny Lennon (Canada) and Ebru Ceylan (Turkey), gave the best national short film award to *Welcome to Baby* ('Hoşgeldin Bebek') by Serhat Koca. National Honorary awards were also handed out to Halil Ergün (Turkey), Yavuz Tuğrul, (Turkey), Macide Tanır (Turkey) and Turgut Inangiray (Turkey).

The **3rd International Eurasia Film Festival** also awarded prizes within three categories: The International Best Feature Film, The Critics' Choice Award and the Network for the Promotion of Asian Cinema (NETPAC). The Best International Feature Film was given to the fabulous *The Band's Visit* by Eran Kolirin. The jury was presided over by Jafar Panahi (Iran), and consisted of Andrei Sigle (Russia), John Landis (USA), Lale Mansur (Turkey), Martha Coolidge (USA), Qin Hailu (China) and Shohreh Aghdashloo (Iran). Best direction was awarded to Abdellatif Kechiche for *The Secret of the Grain*. The Critics' Award for best feature was given to *Under the Bombs* by Philippe Aractingi. The jury consisted of Bojidar Manov, (Bulgaria), Burak Göral (Turkey), Daniela Sannwald (Germany), Firat Yücel (Turkey), Murat Özer (Turkey), Neel Chaudhuri (India) and Yeşim Tabak (Turkey). The NETPAC jury which consisted of Atilla Dorsay (Turkey), Hassouna Mansouri (Tunisia) and Houshang Golmakani (Iran) split the award between *Under the Bombs* and *Egg*. Honorary awards were also handed out to Hanna Schygulla (Germany), Francis Ford Coppola and Shkhar Kapur (India). The aforementioned two filmmakers were also at hand not only to collect their prizes but to screen the Asian premieres of *Youth without Youth* and *Elizabeth: The Golden Age*, respectively.

The success of the festival was quite apparent in not only its contribution to the ever increasing pool of national films that have been produced over the past year but also in its attraction to enticing some of the leading names of cinema to attend for the promotion of the festival. Notable visitors included Stephen Hopkins (UK), Nic Roeg (UK), Miranda Richardson (UK), Mario Kasser (USA), Rita Tushingham (UK), Dan Weldon (UK), Christophe Lambert (Belgium), Sophie Marceau (France), Asif Kapadia (UK), Fatih Akın (Germany/Turkey), Azfar Ali (Iran), Clement Virgo (Canada), Rossif Sutherland (Canada), Jacques Deschamps (France) and Olivier Lorelle (France), to name but a few, who were all at hand to screen or talk about their work. Judging by the current combination of recognizable names from the world of cinema as visitors and also by the dramatic increase in the Turkish films produced this year (in 2004 only 17 movies were released, but by the end of 2007 there will be over 70) it seems all too evident that this particular event will be making significant strides in world film festival/market recognition in the coming years.

(Previously published by IndieWire Magazine.)



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
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POSTSCRIPTUM

Geoffrey Lewis 1920-2008**A personal tribute**

by

Celia Kerslake

Geoffrey Lewis, who died on 12 February 2008 at the age of 87, was the founder of Turkish studies at Oxford University, and a highly respected and much loved figure in Turkish studies worldwide. His pioneering *Teach Yourself Turkish* (1953) was designed to meet a need that he himself had felt when, during the Second World War, he had first got to grips with the language himself. Arranged with the linguistic rigour of his own classical training, and seasoned with those delightful witty touches that were to become the hallmark of all his writings, this most accessible introduction was the indispensable route into Turkish for all British Turcophiles of the post-war

generation. Two years later Lewis's *Turkey* (1955), in Ernest Benn's Nations of the Modern World series, gave the general reader a similarly lucid presentation of Turkey's modern history, geography, demography and culture. The *Turkish Grammar* (1967) soon established itself as the leading authority on the language in the English-speaking world.

My personal acquaintance with Geoffrey Lewis goes back to 1968, when I came to Oxford as a D.Phil. student. Geoffrey was not my official supervisor, but he got involved in various key aspects of the project, including the initial search for a suitable unedited Ottoman text for me to work on, and my initiation into the mysteries of constructing a family tree of manuscripts. His erudition was always dispensed in the most modest and kindly way. Geoffrey retired in 1987, and a year later I returned to Oxford to take up a post created to replace the one that he had held (latterly as Professor) since 1950.

During his retirement Geoffrey and his wife Raphaela (Raff) continued to live in Oxford, and I encountered both of them frequently at Turkey-related

meetings, and at college events at St Antony's. It never took much encouragement to get Geoffrey relating one of his reminiscences, many of which involved well known figures from the world of Turkish culture, such as Halide Edip or Nurullah Ataç. Geoffrey was engaged for many years in research on the Turkish language reform movement, and he would regale one with amusing accounts of some of the more outrageous pseudo-etymologies for supposedly "pure Turkish" neologisms that he had been discovering. The fruit of this research appeared in 2000 in *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success*. Geoffrey and Raff had been members of TASG since its foundation, and unfailingly attended its annual symposia.

As a person, Geoffrey Lewis will be remembered for his kindness, his determination to see the best in others, and his love of jokes. Raff's sudden death four years ago came as a terrible blow to Geoffrey, depriving him of a partnership going back over more than sixty years. They had had two children and four grandchildren. After the tragic death of their daughter Lally in 1976, Geoffrey and Raff had played a very special role in the lives of her two children, effectively going through the role of parents all over again. Small wonder, then, that the speech of tribute at his funeral was given by one of these two young people, to whom Geoffrey was known as 'Bear', and who was most fondly remembered for his love of 'bodging', one of two hobbies he himself recorded in *Who's Who*.

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An efficient infrastructure already exists for the compilation and physical production of the *Review*, in the form of an Editorial Team, an Editorial Advisory Panel, and assembling and printing facilities. There is also a core of regular contributors.

The new Editor will

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If you yourself might have something to offer in this attractive honorary role, or you know of someone who might be suitable, please contact TASG's Administrative Secretary, Mrs Rezan Muir (details on back cover). Any communication on this subject will be treated with the utmost confidentiality.

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
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